A
SYSTEM
OF
INTELLECTUCAL PHILOSOPHY.
BY REV. ASA MAHAN,
FIRST PRESIDENT OF CLEVLAND UNIVERSITY
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"How charming is divine philosophy!
Not harsh, and crabbed, as dull fools suppose,
But musical as is Apollo's lute,
And a perpetual feast of nectared sweets,
Where no crude surfeit reigns."
_____________
REVISED AND ENLARGED FROM THE SECOND EDITION.
[Retyped and reprinted by Rick Friedrich in May 1999.
rickfriedrich@hotmail.com
Permission requested for commertial use.]
NEW YORK:
A. S. BARNES & CO., 51 JOHN-STREET.
CINCINNATI:--H. W. DERBY.
1854.
Entered according to an Act of Congress, in the year 1854, by
ASA MAHAN,
In the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the United States, for
the Southern District of the State of New York.
DEDICATORY PREFACE.
TO THE FIRST EDITION.
THE following Treatise presents the sum of a course of Lectures, which, for six or eight years past, I have been in the habit of delivering to successive classes, on the subject of Intellectual Philosophy. One thing I may say in relation to this subject, without boasting. No class have yet passed through this course, without becoming deeply interested in the science of Mental Philosophy; and, in their judgment, receiving great benefit from the truths developed, as well as from the method of development which was adopted. Hence the desire has been very generally expressed by those who have attended the course of instruction, as well as by others who have become acquainted with the general featrures of the system taught, to have it presented to the public in a form adapted to popular reading. In conformity to such suggestions, as well as to the permanent convictions of my own mind, the following Treatise has been prepared. In preparing it, it has been my aim to reject light from no source whatever from which it could be obtained, and at the same time to maintain the real prerogative of manly independence of thought. The individuals to whom I feel most indebted as a philosopher, are Coleridge, Cousin, and Kant--three luminaries of the first order in the sphere of philosophy. How far proper discriminations have been made in the study of their works, the reader will be able to judge. With these remarks, I would simply add, that
TO THE BELOVED AND HONORED PUPILS, WHO HAVE HITHERTO PASSED FROM UNDER MY INSTRUCTION AS A TEACHER OF MENTAL SCIENCE, THE FOLLOWING TREATISE IS NOW AFFECTIONATELY DEDICATED, WITH THE EXPRESSION OF THE FOND HOPE, THAT IN ALL FUTURE CLASSES, WHICH IT MAY BE MY PRIVILEGE TO INSTRUCT, I MAY, IN THE LANGUAGE OF ANOTHER, "FIND THE SAME LOVE OF PHILOSOPHY, AND THE SAME INDULGENCE TO THE PROFESSOR."
PREFATORY NOTE
TO THE REVISED EDITION.
__________________
SINCE the publication of the first edtion of this work, the author has had the benefit resulting from successive years in teaching the same, and of a careful reading of other works upon the same subject. In this manner, he has been enabled to perceive defects that needed correction in the work, as first presented. The work is now given to the public, as the result of his mature reflections upon this fundamental science. Some of the most important chapters have been so entirely rewritten and remodeled, as to render the present, in some important respects, a new work on Intellectual philosophy. I may notice, among others, the chapter on Sense, the examination of the true as distinguished from false systems of Philosophy, in the Miscellaneous Topics, and the development of the evidence of the being and perfection of God, in the last chapter. The author has always been fully persuaded of the correctness of his views in respect to external perception, but has felt a growing dissatisfaction with his manner of presenting the subject, in the chapter referred to. In the present edition, this subject, so fundamental to a right system of mental science, is so presented as to meet his ideas in most, if not all respects. One of the great wants of the age is a fundamental examination of false systems of Philosophy, as developed in Materialism, and in the various forms of Idealism, as distinguished from the true system. [Ed. note: See Mahan's later materpiece, <a herf:"http://members.truepath.com/Alethea_In_Heart/index-9.html">History of Philosophy. </A>] This he has attempted, and, as it appears to him, accomplished, in the chapter on Miscellaneous Topics. The improvements made, in presenting the topic last named, will be appreciated, we think, by all who carefully read the chapter in which they appear. It has been the aim of the author to give the public a work, on this great science, which should meet the fundamental philosophic wants of the age. As such an attempt, he commends his production to the careful study of all who would understand this science.
I close with a suggestion to teachers who may introduce this work to their pupils as a text-book. No system of questions is here proposed. Each topic has a heading, however, which gives the subject-matter therein developed. My own method of teaching has always been, to read to the class this heading, and then require the student to state, in his own words, the subject-matter contained in the topic referred to. Two benefits result to the pupil by this mode of teaching: 1. He is made to understand the subject much better than he can by any system of questions. 2. He acquires the important habit of first forming distinct conceptions of a subject before speaking, and then of clothing his thoughts in appropriate language. Much higher and more perfect forms of mental discipline are acquired by this mode of teaching, than by any other which we have ever tried.
CLEVELAND, OHIO, August 1854.
CONTENTS.
CHAPTER I.
INTRODUCTION.
Classification of the Sciences~Object of Mental Philosophy~What is to be expected from such Investigations~Mental Philosophy, as a Science, possible~The Method in conformity to which Psychological Researches should be conducted~The above the only correct Psychological Method~Utility of this Science~State of Mind requisite to a successful prosecution of this Science. 1-12
CHAPTER II.
CLASSIFICATION OF MENTAL PHENOMENA AND POWERS.
Mental Faculties indicated by the phenomena above classified~Object of Mental Philosophy~ Meaning of the words Mental Faculties. 23
CHAPTER III.
PHENOMENA OF THE INTELLIGENCE.
Principle of Classification~Contingent and necessary Phenomena of Thought defined.
IDEAS OF BODY AND SPACE.
Idea of Body contingent~Idea of Space necessary~Other characteristics of these two Ideas~Idea of Body relative~Idea of Space absolute~Idea of Body implies that of Limitation~Idea of Space implies the absence of Limitation~Idea of Body, a sensible representation~Idea of Space a pure rational conception.
IDEAS OF SUCCESSION, AND TIME, OR DURATION.
Idea of Succession contingent~The idea of Time necessary~Other Characteristics of these Ideas
IDEAS OF THE FINITE AND OF THE INFINITE.
Remarks of Locke~Characteristics of these Ideas~Idea of Finite contingent and relative; that of the Infinite necessary and absolute.
IDEAS OF MENTAL PHENOMENA AND PERSONAL IDENTITY.
Idea of Mental Phenomena contingent and relative~Idea of Personal Identity necessary~ Necessary ideas distinguished as conditional and unconditional.
IDEAS OF PHENOMENA AND SUBSTANCE.
Idea of substance explained~Idea of Phenomena contingent and relative~that of Substance necessary~Our Ideas of Substance not obscure, but clear and distict.
IDEAS OF EVENTS AND CAUSE.
The idea of Events contingent and relative; that of Cause necessary~Theory of Dr. Brown and others~Observations on Mr. Dugald Stewart.
IDEA OF POWER.
Conclusion of the present Analysis. 17-37
CHAPTER IV.
APPLICATION OF THE PRECEDING ANALYSIS.
LOGICAL AND CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF IDEAS.
Logical order~Chronological order.
PRIMARY INTELLECTUAL FACULTIES PRE-SUPPOSED BY THE PRECEDINNG ANALYSIS.
These Faculties why called Primary~Also called Intuitive Faculties~Relation of Primitive Intuitive Faculties to each other~Importance of the Truths above elucidated~Classification of Intellectual Phenomena given by Kant. 38-46
CHAPTER V.
CONSCIOUSNESS.
Consciousness Defined~Self-Consciousness conditioned on Reason, but not a function of Reason~Natural, or spontaneous, and philosophical, or reflective Conscousness~Process of classification and Generalization in Reflection, illustrated~Functions of Consciousness~Necessity of relying implicitly upon the testimony of Consciousness~Consciousness, a distinct function or faculty of the Intellect~Theory of Dr. Brown--Meaning of the term Consciousness as employed by Sir William Hamilton. 47-59
CHAPTER VI.
SENSE.
To be distiguished from Sensation~Spontaneous and voluntary determination of Sense~Mental process in Perception~Objects of Perception~Common and Philosophic Doubts in respect to the comparative validity of the affirmations of Sense and Consciousness~The Province of Philosophy~Comparative validity of the affirmations of Sense and Consiousness~True theory of external Perception~Theory Verified~The above Theory verified as a truth of Science~Qualities of Matter: Primary qualities, Secundo-primary qualities, and Scondary qualities~What these qualities are in general~Representative and Presentative Knowledge~True theory of Perception stated and verified~False theory of external perception: The Scholastic Theory; The Cosmothetic Theory, and the Idealistic Theories~Reasons for the Idealistic Theories~Objections to these Theories~Hypothises, that all our knowledge of Matter is derived through Sensation exclusively, the main source of error in Philosophy~Explanation given by Kant and the Transcendental School generally of the fact of Sense-perception~Is color a primary or secondary quality of Matter?~Validity of our knowledge of the Non-Ego or Matter--Conclusion of the present Exposition. 60-107
CHAPTER VII.
SECONDARY FACULTIES.
UNDERSTANDING.
Notions Particular and General.
ELEMENTS OF WHICH NOTIONS ARE CONSTITUDED.
Contingent Elements~Necessary Elements: Substance and Cause the fundamental elements of notions~Evolution of these Laws not Arbitrary~Time and Space.~I. Time and Space~Errors of Kant: 1. In respect to the relation of Phenomena and Noumena to Time and Space~2. Relation of the Ideas of Time and Space to Penomena~II. Identity and Diversity, Resemblance and Difference~III. The idea of a Whole , as including its Parts, or Parts in reference to the Whole. ~Kant's Anatomy of Pure Reason.~IV. The Category of Quantity~The Category of Quantity distinct from that previously considered~V. Of Quality~VI. Of Relation~VII. Of Modality~VIII. The Idea of Law~Conceptions as distinguished from Notions~A Fact often attending Perception~Mistake of Mr. Stewart~Notions and Conceptions characterized as complete or incomplete, true or false~Mistake of Coleridge in respect to the Undersanding.108-125
CHAPTER VIII.
FACULTY OF JUDGEMENT.
Abstraction~Abstract Notions, what, and how formed?~General Notions, how formed.
CLASSIFICATION.
Forms of Classification~Classification, in what sense arbitrary~Genera and Species.
GENERALIZATION.
Rules in respect to Generalization~The Term General sometimes used in a limited sense.
GENERAL TERMS.
Theory of the Realists~Theory of the Nominalists~Theory of the Conceptualists.
UNDERSTANDING AND JUDGMENT DISTINGUISED.
Distiction between the Understanding and Judgment verified~Observations of Kant~Relations of the Understanding and Judgement. 126-188
CHAPTER IX.
ASSOCIATION.
Term defined~Term Association, why preferred~The Associating Principle not without Law~Law of Association stated and defined~Existence of Law, when established~The present Hypotheses, when established as the Law of Association~A priori Argument~All the Phenomena referred to the commonly received Laws, can be explained on this Hypothesis~Phenomena exist which can be accounted for on this, and no other Hypothesis~Facts connected with particular Diseases~This Hypothesis established and illustrated, by reflecting upon the facts of Association~Argument summarily stated~ Explanatory Remarks~Reasons why different objects excite similar Feelings in our Minds~Application of the Principles above illustrated~Ground of the Mistake of Philosophers in respect to the Laws of Association~Action of the associating Principle in different Individuals~Influence of Habit~Standards of Taste and Fashion~Vicissitudes in respect to such Standards~Peculiarities of Genius associated with Judgment, or correct Taste~Influence of Writers and Speakers of splendid Genius, but incorrect Taste~Danger of vicious Associations~Unrighteous Prejudices, how justified~Giving Individuals a bad Name, spreading false Reports, &c.~Influence of the associating Principle in perpetuating existing mental Characteristics. 139-161
CHAPTER X.
MEMORY AND RECOLLECTION.
Terms defined~States of Mind entering into and connected with these Processes~The above statement verified~Principle on which Objects are remembered with Ease and Distinctness~Deep and distinct Inpressions, on what conditioned~Diversity of Powers of Memory, as developed in different Individuals~Philosophic Memory~Local Memory~Artificial Memory.
MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS.
A ready and retentive Memory~The vast diverse Power of Memory possessed by different Individuals~Improvement of Memory~Memory of the Aged~Duration of Memory. 161-172
CHAPTER XI.
IMAGINATION.
Definitions of distinguished Philosophers~Objections to the above Definitions~Another definition proposed~Imagination and Fancy distinguished~Another Definition of the term Fancy.
IMAGINATION AND FANCY ELUCIDATED.
Preliminary Remarks~Elucidation.
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CREATIONS OF THE IMAGINATION.
1. Elements of Diverse Scenes blended into one Whole~2. Blending the Diverse~3. Blending Opposites~4. Blending things in their Nature alike~5. Combining Numbers into Unity, and dissolving and separating Unity into Number~6. Adding to, or abstracting some Quality from, an Object~7. Blending with external objects the Feelings which they excite in us~8. Abstracting certain Characteristics of Objects, and blending them into Harmony with some leading Idea~9. Throwing the fleeting Thoughts, Sentiments, and Feelings, of our past Existence, into one beatiful Conception.
REMARKS ON THE PRECEDING ANALYSIS.
Remarks of Coleridge.
CREATIONS OF THE IMAGINATIONS, WHY NOT ALWAYS FICTIONS.
Sphere of the Imagination not confined to Poetry~Law of Taste relative to the Action of the Imagination.
IMAGINATION THE ORGAN OF IDEALS.
Idea defined~Ideal defined~Ideals, Particular and General~Ideals not confined to Ideas of the Beautiful, the Grand, and the Sublime~Ideals not fixed and changeless, like Ideas~Ideals the Foundation of Mental Progress~Ideals in the DIvine and Human Intelligence.
ACTION OF THE JUDGMENT RELATIVE TO THAT OF THE IMAGINATION.
Taste difined~Productions of the Imagination when not regulated by correct Judgment or good Taste.
PRODUCTIONS IN WHICH THE ACTION OF THE FANCY OR IMAGINATION IS MOST CONSICUOUS.
COMBINATIONS OF THOUGHT DENOMINATED WIT, AS DISTINGUISHED FROM THOSE RESULTING FROM THE PROPER ACTION OF THE IMAGINATION OR FANCY.
Bombast~Burlesque~Sarcasm.
PROPRIETY OF USING THE IMAGINATION AND FANCY IN WORKS OF FICTION.
False Idea in respect to the Influence of Familiarity with the popular Fictitious Writings of the Day~Imagination and Fancy~How improved. 173-213
CHAPTER XII.
REASON.
Reason difined~Coleridge's Characteristics of Reason as distinguished from the Understanding.
Secondary Ideas of Reason~Idea of Right and Wrong.
This Idea exists in all Minds in which Reason is developed~Idea of Right and Wrong necessary~Ideas dependent on that of Right and Wrong, &c.~Chronological Antecedent to the Idea of Right and Wrong, &c.
Idea of Fitness.
This Idea synonymous with Right and Wrong, &c.
Idea of the Useful, or the Good.
The Summum Bonum.
Relations of the Ideas of Right and Wrong and of the Useful to each other.
This purely a Psychological Question~Nature of Virtue~Happiness a Phenomenon of the Sensibility~Relation of Willing to Happiness~Conclusion necessarily resulting from the Facts above stated~Argument Expanded~Additional Considerations~Argument stated in view of another Example~Result of the Discussion thus far~Other important Considerations~The above Argument of universal Application~Obligation not affirmed in view of the subjective Tendencies~Obligation not affirmed in view of the subjective Tendencies of Right or Wrong Willing~Another General Consideration~Mutable Actions.
Ideas of Liberty and Necessity.
Ideas defined~These Ideas Universal and Necessary~Idea of Liberty realized only in the Action of the Will~Chronological Antecedents of these Ideas.
Ideas of the Beautiful and Sublime.
Opinions of Philosophers~Considerations indicating the existence in the Mind of Ideas of Reason, designated by the terms Beautiful and Sublime~Objection to the Universality of these Ideas~Chronological Antecedent of these Ideas~Illustration from Cousin~Explanatory Remarks.
Idea of Harmony~Reflections.
Mind constituted according to fundamental Ideas~Poety defined.
Idea of Truth.
Idea defined~Chronological Antecedent of this Idea.
Idea of Law.
Citations from Coleridge~Coleridge's Definition of Law~Law, Subjective and Objective~Conclusion from the above~Chronological Antecedent to the Idea~Apparent Mistake in respect to Law~Theory and Law distinguished~Nature of Proof~Fundamental and superficial Thinkers.
The Philosophic Idea.
Chronological Antecedent of this Idea.
First Truths, or Necessary Principles of Reason, as distinguished from Contingent Principles.
Contingent and Necessary Principles defined and distinguised~First Truths defined~Kind of Proof of which Necessary Ideas or Principles admit~Statement illustrated by a Reference to the Idea of God~Idea and Principle of Reason distinguished~Axioms, Postulates, and Definitions.
Idea of Science, Pure and Mixied.
Idea of Science deifined~Pure Sciences~Mixed Sciences.
Function of Reason denominated Conscience.
Conscience defined~General Remarks~Objection~Term Conscience as used in the Scriptures.
General Remarks pertaining to Reason.
Relation of Reason to other Intellectural Faculties~Through Reason Man is a Religious Being~Reason common to all Men~Error of Coleridge~Paralogism of Cousin~Transcedentalism~Reason, in what sense Impersonal~Reason, in what sense identical in all Men. 214-269
RECAPITULATION, WITH ADDITIONAL SUGGESTIONS.
Intellectual Faculties enumerated~Influence of the above Distinctions~Errors of Kant~Classification of Mental Faculties.
Remarks upon the relations of Intuitions to one another.
Intuitions cannot be opposed to each other~Different Intuition Faculties cannot contradict each other~The logical Consequents of no one Intuition can be in opposition to any primary Intuition, nor to the logical Consequents of the same~Error of Kant and Coleridge.
Secondary Faculties.
Understanding~The Judgment~The Associating Principle~Imagination. 270-282
CHAPTER XIV.
SPONTANEOUS AND REFLECTIVE DEVELOPMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE.
General characteristics of all Objects of Knowledge, and of our Knowledge of the same~Distict Apprehension conditioned on Attention~Spontaneous Development of the Intelligence~Characteristics of this Spontaneity~Characteristics Illustrated.
Additional Remarks and Illustrations.
Categories of Spontaneous and Reflective Reason~Relation of Observaion and Reflection to this original Spontaneity~Confidence reposed in the first Truths of Reason, how awakened~Use of the Common Demonstrations of the Divine Existence~Conclusions arrived at by a process of Reasoning, when false~Reasons of the Diversity and Difference of the Opinions of Men~Sources of Error. 283-292
CHAPTER XV.
ORIGIN OF IDEAS.
The two Scools in Philosophy~Principles of Lock~Theory of Kant~Principles of Locke tested with referenc to Necessary Ideas~Principles of Lock fail in respect to Understanding-conceptions~Error of Kant~Position of Kant true in respect to Understanding -conceptions and Affirmations of the Judgment.
True Explanation.
Intuitions~Notions~The Judgment~Associating Principle and the Imagination~Scientific Movement.
Manner in which the General, Abstract, and Universal, are eliminated from the Concrete and Particular.
General Notions~Abstract Notions~Universal and Necessary Ideas~Error of Cousin. 293-304
CHAPTER XVI.
LAWS OF INVESTIGATION.
Investigation and Reasoning distinguished~Substances, how known~Iduction of Phenomena, for what purposes made~Induction pertaining to particular Substances~Iduction for purposes of Classification into Genera and Species~Finding a General Fact, or Order of Sequence~The Probable and Improbable~Order of Sequence~The Discovery of Universal Law.
Tesitmony.
Chararcteristics of the Statements made by a Witness~Circumstances which go to establish the Credibility of a Witness~Corroborating CIrcumstances aside from the Character of the Witness~Concurrent Testimony. 305-315
CHAPTER XVII.
REASONING.
The Syllogism the universal from of Reasoning~The above Principle verified~Forms in which the Major Premise appears~Principles which lie at the Basis of all Conclusions from a Process of Reasoning~Remarks upon these Principles~Remarks on Aristotle's Dictum.
Different kinds of Reasoning.
Distictions Elucidated~Distictions between Demonstrative and Probable Reasoning~Common Impression in respect to the Extent of Demonstrative Reasoning~Method fo Proof~Real Proof found in no other Method~Sources of Fallacies in Reasoning.
Conception of Logic.
All Things occur according to Rules~Logic defined~Relations of Logic to the other Sciences. 316-330
CHAPTER XVII.
MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS.
The Bearing of the Philosophy of Locke upon Scienc, properly so called.
Kant's distinction between Analytical and Synthetical Judgments.~Analytical and Synthetical Judgments defined and distinguised~Consequences which Kant deduced from the Judgments as defined by himself~Errors of Kant in the Application of the above Principles.
True and False Systems of Philosophy.
Criterion or Tests by which we can distinguish the True from all False Systems~Theory of Realism: This Theory verified~Materialism: Conditions on which the Matieral Hypothesis can be sustained: Objections to Materialism~Systems of Idealism~Ideal Dualism: What are Realities according to this System~Remarks on this System~Subjective Idealism: System stated: Remarks upon this System~Pantheism or the System of Absolute Identity: Elements and characteristics of the system: Remarks upon this System~Pure Idealism: System stated: General Remarks upon the Systems~General Remarks upon Idealism.
Eclecticism of Cousin.~System stated~Remarks upon this System~Common Sense defined~Common Sense a Standard of Truth~Philosophic Principles, why rejected by the Mass of Mankind~Dictates of Common Sense, how known and distinguised~Characteristics of Men distinguished for Common Sense. 331-404
CHAPTER XIX.
THE INTELLEGENCE OF MAN, AS DISTINGUISHED FROM THAT OF THE BRUTE.
Brute Instincts classified~Manifestations of Instinctive Intelligence~Principle on which the Argument is based~Points of Resemblance between the Man and the Brute~Hypotheses on which these common Facts may be explained~Points of Dissimilarity between Man and the Brute~Facts appled~General Remarks. 405-422
CHAPTER XX.
MATTER AND SPIRIT.
Principle on which the Argument is based~The Soul, how revealed to itself~Principles applied~Common Objections. 423-426
CHAPTER XXI.
IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL.
Preliminary Considerations~Principles on which the present Argument Rests~Direct Argument~Future Retributions. 427-436
CHAPTER XXII.
THE IDEA OF GOD.
Preliminary Considerations.~God, the Unconditioned and Absolute Cause of all that exists Conditionally.~Possible Hypothesis on this subject~None but the Theistic Hypothesis can be true~The Theistic Hypothesis established as a truth of Science~Attributes necessarily implied in the idea of the Unconditioned~Attributes of the Unconditioned necessrily supposed in the facts of the Universe~Facts of Creation bearing upon our present inquiries~The Theistic Hypothesis intuitively certain from these Facts~Truth of this Hyposthesis more partcularly developed~Does Creation indicate the character of God as Infinite and Perfect~God, the Infinite and~This a First Truth of Reason~Reasons why these Elements have not yet been designated~Foundation of the Conviction that God is both Infinite and Perfect~Nature of the Arguments above adduced~Relation of the Idea of God above elucidated to all other Ideas of Him.~The idea of a System of Theology.~Postualte, Axioms, &c. in Theology~Kind of Proof pertaining to each particulatr Attribute~This science to be evolved in the light of the Works of God, Material and Mental, and of the Teachings of Inspiration~Theology, Natural and Revealed~Difference between Mystery and Absurdity in Theology~Absurdity defined~Mystery defined~Mystery and Absurdity defined in another form~Fundamental Characteristics of Real Revelation from God~Revealed Theology defined~Defects of Method in the common Systems of Theology~Use of the common Treaties on Natural Theology~Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 437-476
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY.
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CHAPTER I.
INTRODUCTION.
Classification of the Sciences.
ALL substances may be classified under two general divisions, MATTER and MIND. This arrangement presents a twofold division of the sciences, to wit, Material and Mental.
Object of Mental Philosophy.
Mental Philosophy is the science of Mind, and of the human Mind in particular. Its object is a correct classification of the phenomena, for the purpose of a full and distinct development of the Powers, Susceptibilities, and Laws of the human Mind. This department of inquiry being completed, Mental Philosophy, as a science, then ascends to an investigation of the wide field of Moral Obligation, for the purpose of developing the extent, limits, and grounds of human responsibility.
What is to be expected from such Investigations.
The field before us is of almost boundless extent. We are not, therefore, to expect that any one treatise will present all that may be known of the human Mind. All that I hope to accomplish, is to introduce the inquirer to the science, and give to his inquiries in respect to it, a right direction. His own investigations will then lead him to exhaustless treasures of wisdom and knowledge.
Mental Philosophy, as a Science, Possible.
Every substance in existence is known, and can be known by us, through and only through its respective phenomena. This, with us, is the changeless condition of knowledge in respect to all realities which lie around us in the universe. Every power or substance in existence is knowable to us, so far only as we can know its phenomena. The question, then, whether Mental Philosophy is possible to us, depends wholly upon this, whether the Mind, in the action of its varied powers and susceptibilities, is so revealed to itself, that it can know its own operations or phenomena? To this question, but one answer can be given. We are so constituted, that we have a knowledge of whatever passes in the interior of our minds. This power, or law of our Mental Faculties, explain the fact in whatever manner we please, is denominated Consciousness, which is a faithful witness of whatever passes within us. On the authority of Consciousness, all men do and must rely. Here Scepticism itself assumes the garb of positive faith: for in the language of Descartes, "let a man doubt everything else, he cannot doubt that he doubts;" and "he cannot doubt that he doubts" for this reason, that he cannot but rely, in some form or other, upon the testimony of his own Consciousness.
Not only are all things which pass within us given as phenomena of Consciousness, but we have also the power of retaining these phenomena under the eye of the mind, until we have fully resolved them into their original elements, and marked their characteristics. This power or exercise of the mind is denominated relflection, and is conditioned on the Will.
Mental Philosophy then becomes possible for the same reasons, and on the same conditions that physical science, or Natural Philosophy is possible. Facts equally undeniable, and equally distinct and palpable, are given as the foundation of both sciences. All that is required in either instance, is, that our researches be conducted upon right principles--that we introduce into our investigations nothing but actual facts,--that these facts be correctly arranged and classified,--and that none but legitimate conclusions be drawn from them.
The Method in conformity to which Psychological Researches should be conducted.
Having shown that Mental Philosophy, as a science, is possible, we will now contemplate the question in respect to the Method which should be adopted in conducting our investigations. Every philosopher commences his inquiries in conformity to a certain ideal of which he has conceived, and which he has assumed as involving the most perfect method in conformity to which such investigations can be conducted. A remark of Cousin on this point demands special attention. "As is the method of a philosopher, so will be his system; and the adoption of a method, decides the destiny of a philosophy." It becomes us, therefore, at the threshold of our inquiries, to stop, and with great care, determine the Method in conformity to which we are to investigate the powers, susceptibilities, and laws of the mysterious substance before us. The folowing Principles I would propose as involving and announcing the true Method to be adopted.
1. We should present to our own minds, with great distinctness, the question, what are the facts which lie at the basis of all our conclusions in respect to this science; facts upon which all legitimate conclusions do and must rest? They are, as all must admit, the facts which lie under the eye of Consciousness. But what are these facts? In other words, what are the sole and exclusive objects of Consciousness? Not, surely, as Cousin observes, the "external world, or its Creator--not the substance, nature, essence, or Faculties of the soul itself." They are the soul in its manifestations--in the exercise of its various Faculties. Upon these all our conclusions in regard to the nature of these Faculties, as well as upon the nature of the soul itself, and of all other objects are based. As the soul basis of physical science, we have the phenomena of perception. As the basis of Psychology, we have the phenomena of Consciousness, and these only. As we know the mind only through its phenomena, or manifestations, so all legitimate conclusions in respect to it must be revealed and affirmed by these manifestations. Hence I remark.
2. That in pursuing our investigations according to the true Psychological Method, we shall commence with no questions in respect to the natrue or essence of mind, whether it is material or immaterial, or in respect to its various powers, or functions, in respect to the origin of mental phenomena. All such questions are to be adjourned until we have observed, characterized, and classified the phenomena, or operations which now, in our present state of mental adevelopment, lie under the eye of Consciousness. The question, in regard to the origin of mental phenomena, involves, as its foundation and starting point, a knowledge of such phenomena as they now exist. Otherwise we are inquiring after the origin of that of the natrue of which we are profoundly ignorant. So also, if, before we have attained this knowledge, we study and attempt the resolution of questions pertaining to the nature or essence of the mind, or in respect to its Faculties, we violate the fundamental law of all correct philosophizing, to wit: that substances are known and are to be studied only through their phenomena. The true Psychological Method does not neglect any legitimate questions in respect to ontology, or the origin of mental phenomena. It simply adjourns these, till another preliminary department of inquiry has been completed.
In pursuing our inquiries in respect to mental phenomena and in respect to the characteristics of particular phenomena, two rules of fundamental importance present themselves,--to wit: Suppose or assume, as real, nothing which does not exist--and omit, or disregard, nothing which does exist.
3. The phenomena which lie under the eye of Consciousness clearly indicate a diversity of mental powers, or functions. In conformity to the true Psychological Method, a fundamental aim of the Mental Philosopher will be, to adopt those principles of classification by which these different powers or functions shall be distinctly revealed to the Mind. Two self-evident principles will guide him in determining the different powers or functions of the Mind. Phenomena in their fundamental characteristics alike, are to be attributed to one and the same Faculty. Phenomena, in their fundamental characteristics unlike, suppose a diversity of powers or functions. Hence the vast importance of classification with exclusive reference to fundamental characteristics.
4. Amid the endlessly diversified phenomena of Consciousness, there are, in the depths of the Mind, particular phenomena, which reveal the Laws which govern the action of the different mental powers. One of the principal aims of the Mental Philosopher, in conformity to a correct Psychological Method, will be, to fix upon, and develope those facts, or phenomena, by which the Laws of thought, feeling, and action, are revealed. No department of inquiry in the wide field of Mental science is of greater importance than this.
5. Having by careful reflection, and in comfromity to correct principles, ascertained, classified, and arranged the phenomena of the Mind, as they now lie under the eye of Consciousness, a correct Psychological Method would then lead us to move the important questions pertaining to the origin of these phenomena, to Ontology, and to the nature, extent, limits, and grounds of Moral Obligation. This completes the circle of investigations in the wide domain of Mental Science. Much will be done for Philosopphy, if this circle is completed according to the method above developed.
The Above the only correct Psychological Method.
A moment's reflection will convince us, that this is the philosophical, and I may add, the only philosophical Method. The powers of nature, external and internal, are known to us only in their manifestations, or through their respective phenomena. These manifestations must, of course, be known, or we must remain in total ignorance of the powers themselves.
This is the universal Method, the Method which lies at the basis of all real science pertaining to Matter or Mind. In pursuing our investigations in strict conformity to the principles of this Method, we shall be conducted to no conjectural conclusions, but to certain knowlegde; provided we have marked with correctness existing phenomena, and have proceeded logically from facts thus given, to our conclusions. It puts us, to say the least, upon the right road to knowledge. If we "fall out by the way," the fault will be our own, and not that of the Method adopted.
If we arrive at correct conclusions, we shall, also, in the light of the Method pursued, understand and be able to assign the reasons for those conclusions, a most important attainment in the progress of mental development. If, on the other hand, we adopt any false conclusions, our Method itself presents the best means for their correction. No individual will long remain in the embrace of any important error, who has adopted a correct method of investigation, and who rigidly adheres to the principles of that method.
Utility of this Science.
But little need be said to impress the inquirer with a conviction of the importance of our investigations.
Mental Philosophy is the science of self-reflection. It teaches us to know ourselves, in our relations to God, and to the universe around us.
The importance of this science may likewise be seen, in the light of its relations to all other departments of human investigation. "Whatever be the object of inquiry," says Cousin, "God or the world, beings the most near or remote, you neither know or can know them, but upon one condition, namely, that you have the faculty of knowledge in general; and you neither possess nor can attain a knowledge of them except in proportion to your general faculty of knowledge. Whatever you attain a knowledge of, the highest or the lowest thing, your knowledge in the last result rests, both in respect to its extent and its legitimacy, upon the reach and validity of that faculty, by whatever name you call it, Spirit, Reason, Mind, Intelligence, Understanding." One of the first and great inquires of man, then, is the nature, extent and validity of this faculty. This is Intellectual Philosophy. This is Psychology, a science, which indeed is not the whole of Philosophy, but "must be allowed to be its foundation and starting point."
By developing the laws of human belief, and by habituating the mind to contemplate and investigate CAUSES through their respective phenomena, this science also furnishes a light, to guide our investigations in every other science, and presents the strongest possible motives to lead us onward.
Nor is its connection with morality and religion less important and influential. Indeed, here lies its chief importance. The development of the laws of evidence, will place a clear light, the ground of our assent to the Divine authority of Christianity, so far as external evidence is conserned. A development of the powers and susceptibilities of the mind itself, will lead us to a correct understanding of the bearing of the internal evidence of Christianity. A development of the grounds of moral obligation will lead us to perceive distinctly, and to feel deeply, our obligation to obey the moral precepts of Christianity. Every truth, every principle and precept of Christianity, supposes some one or more faculties or susceptibilities of the mind, to which they are addressed. A distinct knowledge of these faculties and susceptibilities, places those truths and principles in the clearest possible light before the mnd.
One other consideration will show clearly the important bearing which our present inquiries have upon religion. The study of Mind, according to the Method above announced, implies, as its foundation and starting point, careful investigation of mental phenomena. Among these phenomena ideas occupy a very important place, and among the most fundamental and important of all our ideas are the conceptions of the infinite and perfect, that is, of God, of eternity, of immortality, of moral obligation, and of future retributions. In developing the characteristics, origin and grounds of these ideas, we are determining our convictions in regard to many of the most important and fundamental truths of religion. We are moulding and forming convichtions which will, and must determine the meaning, which we shall attach to the most important portions of the sacred volume iteslf.
If we should appeal to facts, we should find the fullest verification of all that is said above. All the forms of corrupt Christianity which have appeared for the last eighteen centuries, all the false religions which have ever cursed the earth, all the forms of infidelity and scepticism, which the seathngs of human depravity have, in any age, thrown upon the surface of society, have had their foundation in systems of false Philosophy. No maxim is more fully verified, by universal observation than this. As is a man's Philosophy so is his Theology. The changeless laws of our being render us, in all departments of research and action, philosophic beings. In religion, we can no more be exempt from the influence of Philosophy, than in all other departments of investigation. Suppose we professedly, as some have done, repudiate all Philosophy, and approach the Sacred Volume, to be taught of God, irrespective of any philosophic speculations. What is this but the enunciation of a peculiar system of Philosophy--a system which, after all, will determine, in many essential respects, the meaning which we shall attach to the most important responses of the Sacred Oracles. God hath joined Philosophy and Religion together. We do violence to the nature which He has given us, when we attempt to put them asunder. False Philosophy is the mother of false religions. A correct Philosophy is the handmaid of true Religion.
In short, in every condition and relation in life, next to the wisdom, which, by direct inspiration, "cometh from above," is a correct and comprehensive knowledge of Mental Philosophy, important to man. To the citizen, this science is useful by giving him the reasons of the duties devolved upon him in all the relations of life. To the theologian, it will be of great use, by enabling him not only to understand correctly the truths and principles of Christianity, but also to present them in such a manner that he will "commend himself to every man's conscience in the sight of God." How true also is the sentiment advanced by the great philosopher of England, to wit, that no man is qualified to fill the sphere of and enlightened statesman, who has not thought much and profoundly upon the infinite, the just, the right, the true, and the good.
State of Mind requisite to a successful prosecution of this Science.
It remains to speak upon one topic more, the spirit requisite to a successful prosecution of this science.
The first requisite that I mention is this, a deep conviction of the importantce of the science. We pursue nothing with energy which, to our minds, does not possess an importance demanding the exertion of our entire powers. If I could impress the inquirer with a due conviction of the importance of our present investigations, and could excite in him a purpose of corresponding inflexibility to master the science, I should not have any unpleasant apprehensions in respect to the result.
I mention, in connection with the above, another requisite, to wit, a love of the science for its own sake; that is, for itself, as well as an account of its relative value. That which strongly appeals, not only to our convictions of what is valuable, but to the sensibilities of our nature, we readily prusue with the most energry and untiring perseverance. But two things are requisite to excit in any mind this love for the science under consideration--a proper conviction of the importance of the science, and familiarity with its great truths and principles. We are naturally such philosophic beings, that almost nothing else delights us so much as philosophic truths and principles, when we once become aquainted with them.
Another essential requisite is the habit or spirit of self-reflection. All legitimate conclusions pertaining to this science rest upon the facts which lie under the eye of Consciousness. To know these facts, that eye must be fixed with long and intese gaze upon them, till their fundamental characteristics are distinctly revealed. Without the spirit of self-reflection the inquirer will make but poor progress in Mental Philosophy. With it, he will "go from strength to strength."
The inquirer who would make progress in this science, must also be deeply imbued with a teachable spirit. This is the true and only philosophic spirit. Under its influence the mind "cries after knowledge, and lifts up its voice for understanding." "It seeks for her as silver, and searches for her as for hid treasures." "Wisdom enters into the heart, and knowledge is pleasant to the soul." The love of truth, for her own sake, takes full possession of the mind. To "sit under her banners," and "dwell in the light of her countenance," all opinions, all systems and prepossessions, contrary to her teachings, are readliy sacrifieced. Facts are wieghed with the utmost care for the exclusive purpose of knowing their characteristics; and all conclusions, however contrary to all preformed theories, are readily admitted, which sustains to such facts the relation of logical antecedents or consequents. In this state of mind, the student will not fail to "understand righteousness, and judgement, and equity; yea, and every good path."
I mention as another indisputable requisite, untiring industry and perseverance. "There is no royal road to knowledge" of any kind; much less to a knowldge of ourselves. Before we attain that high eminence from which the goodly mountains, waving forest, verdant hills, luxuriant valleys, and majestic rivers of this "land of promise," this "land flowing with milk and honey," shall lie out with distictness beneath the enraptured vision; we shall find many a tiresome wilderness to pass, many a rugged steep to climb, and sometimes, perhaps, almost "through the palpable obscure," will we be compelled to "find out our uncouth way." But when that eminence has been attained, no one feels that he has "labored in vain, and spent his strength for nought." Every individual, who is not fully prepared for the toil of hard and tireless thinking, had better abandon this study before he commences it. Otherwise, in addition to all the wretchedness of ignorace, he will be subject to the more depressing influence of conscous unworthiness of the possession of the treasure of knowledge.
I will allude to but one requisite more--a deeply serious state of mind. In no other state are we prepared for deep communion with the mysteries, and for profound contemplations of the sublime and majestic creations of truth. To walk among her "clud-capped towers, gorgeous palaces and solemn temples," and to worship at her shrine, there is no place for triflers here. A trifler neither knows himself nor respects himself. He is, therefore wholly unprepared to inquire for, or appreciate when found, the most momentous of all the revelations of truth, those respecting the nature, character and relations of himself.
The individual who commences, and continues to prosecute, his inquiries pertaining to this science, in the spirit above described, will find in the end a full reward of his labors. The object of the author is not to think for the inquirer, but to enable him to think for himslef.
CHAPTER II.
CLASSIFICATION OF MENTAL PHENOMENA AND POWERS.
"All the facts," says Cousin, "which fall under the Consciousness of man, and consequently under the reflection of the philosopher, resolve themselves into three fundamental facts, which contain all others. These facts which, beyond doubt, are never in reality, solitary, and separate from each other, but which are essentially not the less distict, and which a careful analysis ought to distinguish without dividing, in the complex phenomena of intellectual life; these three facts are expressed in the words TO FEEL, TO THINK, TO ACT." Is this a full and correct classification of the phenomena of the human mind? Are these distinctions real? Are all mental phenomena included in these fundamental facts? These questions I answer in the affirmative for the following reasons:
1. No mental phenomena can be conceived of, which do not fall under one or the other of these facts. What mental operation can we conceive of, which is not a thought, feeling, or choice, purpose, or determination?
2. These classes of phenomena differ from one another, not in degree but in kind. How entirely distinct, for example, is thought, in every degree and modification, from feeling, on the one hand, and mental determination, on the other. Feelings, also, of every kind and modification, stand at an equal remove from thoughts and mental acts or determinations. So of the class last mentioned. Choice in every degree or form makes, in its fundamental chararcteristics, no approach whatever to thoughts or feelings.
3. All men recognize the states of mind designated by the above expressions, as actually existing in human Consciousness, and as clearly distinguisheable from each other. When I affirm to the peasant, or to the philosopher, at one time, that I think so and so; at another that I have particular feelings; and at another still, that I have resolved, or determined upon a particular course of conduct; both alike readily apprehend my meaning, and understand me as referring to states of mind perfectly distinct.
4. In all known languages there are terms employed to designate these three classes of phenomena; terms, each of which is appled to one class exclusively, and never to either of the others. Thus, the term thought is never applied to any mental phenomena but those designated by the words to think. We never use it to designated feelings, or mental determinations of any kind. The terms sensation or emotion are never applied to any but phenomena of feeling. In a similar manner we never apply the terms purpose, willing, dermining, &c., to the phenomena of feeling, but exclusively to those designated by the words to act. The existence of such terms undeniably evince, that the different classes of phenomena, under consideration, are recognized by universal Consciousness, not only as existing, but as entirely distinct from one another.
5. As a final reason I would adduce an argument presented in the work, recently published, on the Will. "The clearness and particularity with which the universal Intelligence has marked the disticiton under consideration, is strikingly indicated by the fact, that there are qualifiying terms in common use, which are applied to each to these classes of phenomena. There are terms, however, which are never applied but to one class. Thus we speak of clear thoughts, but never of clear feelings or determinations. We speak of irrepressible feelings and desires, but never of irrepressible thoughts or resolutions. We also speak of inflexible determinations, but never of inflexible feelings or conceptions. With what perfect distictness, then, must the universal Consciousness have marked thoughts, feelings, and determinations, as phenomena entirely distict from one another--phenomena differeing not in degree but in kind."
Mental Faculties indicated by the phenomena above classified.
The three fold classification of mental phenomena, above established and elucidated, clearly indicate a tri-unity of mental faculties and susceptibilities equally distinct from one another. These faculties and susceptibilities we designate by the terms Intellect or Intelligence, Sensibility or Sensitivity, and Will. To the Intellect we refer all the phenomena of thought, of every kind, degree, and modification. To the Sensibility we refer all feelings, such as sensations, emotions, desires, and affections. To the Will we refer all mental determinations, such as volitions, choices, purposes, &c.
Object of Mental Philosophy.
The object of Mental Philosophy is a full development of the phenomena, characteristics, laws and mutal relationships and dependencies of these different faculties.
Meaning of the words Mental Faculties.
When I speak of a diversity of Mental Faculties, I would by no means be understood as treaching the strange dogma, that the mind is made up of parts which may be separated from one another. Mind is not composed of a diversity of substances. It is one substance, incapable of division. Yet this simple substance, remaining, as it does, always one and identical, is capable of a diversity of functions, or operations, entirely distict from one another. This diversity of capabilities of this one substance, we designate by the words Mental Faculties. As the functions of thought, feeling, and willing, are entirely distict form each other, so we speak of the powers of thought, feeling, and willing, to wit, the Intelligence, Sensibility, and Will, as distict faculties of the Mind.
The remarks made above respecting the Mind itself, will, at once, appear equally applicable to each of the Mental Faculties which have been enumerated. As we speak of the Intelligence, for example, as a Faculty of the Mind entirely distict form those of the Sensibility and Will, without supposing that the Mind is not strictly one substance, so we may speak of the different Powers, or Faculties of the Intelligence itself, without implying that that Faculty, whether applied to the whole Mind, or to any of the departments of the Mind, implies a diversity of functions of the same power, or substance, and not a diversity of substances, or parts.
CHAPTER III.
PHENOMENA OF THE INTELLIGENCE.
WE are now prepared to enter directely upon the great inquiry to to be pursued in the Treatise,-~the Phenomena, Faculties, and Laws of the human Intelligence. As all that we know, or can know, of this, as well as of every other department of the Mind, is revealed to us through the phenomena which lie uneder the eye of Consciousness, the first inquiries which now present themselves are, What are the phenomena of thought thus revealed? What are their fundamental characteristics? In conformity to what principles shall they be classified and arranged?
Principle of Classification.
There is one principle, in conformity to which all intellectual phenomena may be properly classified, and in the light of which, the fundamental characteristics of such phenomena may be very distictly presented. I refer to the modes in which all objects of thought are conceived of by the Intelligence. Of these modes, there are two entirely distinct and separate, the one from the other. Every object of thought is conceived of as existing either contingently or of necessity, that is, that object is conceived of as existing, with the possibility of conceiving of its non-existence, or it is conceived of as existing, with the impossibility of conceiving of its non-existence. If we have any conceptions of an object at all, we must conceive of it as falling under one or the other of these relations. The principle of classification, therefore, is fundamental, and of universal application.
Contingent and necessary Phenomena of Thought defined.
Every thought, conception, cognition, or idea, then, by whatever we may choose to designate it, all the phenomena of the Intelligence, may be classed, as contingent, or necessary. A conception is contingent, when its object may be conceived of as existing with the possibility of conceieving of its non-existence.
An idea is necessary when its object is conceived of as existing with the impossibility of conceiving of its non-existence.
All the phenomena of the Intelligence must, as shown above, fall under one or the other of these relations. It remains now, to iluustrate the principle of classification here adopted, by a reference to an adequate number of particular phenomena, as the basis of important distinctions pertaining to the different functions or powers of the Intelligence. In the notice which we shall take of particular phenomena, other important characteristics, aside from those under consideration, will be developed, while these will be kept prominently in mind, as the grounds of classification.
IDEAS OF BODY AND SPACE.
We will commence our analysis with consideration of two prominent ideas, those of body and space. We are to contemplate them as they now lie in the Intelligence, in its resent state of development. That these ideas are in all minds, which have attained to any considerable degree of development, there can be doubt. The question is, what are their fundamental characteristics?
Idea of Body contingent.
We will begin with the idea of body. Take any one body we please, the book, for an example, which lies bofore us. While we conceive of this body, as existing, we can also with perfect readiness, conceive its non-existence, and that the time may come, when it will cease to exist. The power which brought it into being, may also annihilate it. The same holds true of all bodies, of every kind. All objects around us, the world itself, and the entire universe we contemplate as existing with the possibility of, at the same time, conceiving of their non-existence. They do exist. They may cease to be. They may be annihilated. There is no difficulty of conceiving of these propositions as true. Nor is there any perceived contradiction between them. The idea of body then is contingent. We always conceive of the object of that idea as existing, with the possibility of, at the same time, conceiving of its non-existence.
Idea of Space necessary.
We now turn to a consideration of the idea of space. We can, as shown above, readily conceive of the annihilation of all bodies, of the universe itself. But when we have conceived of this, can we conceive that space, in which the universe exists, may be annihilated? We cannot. We conceive of space as a reality, as really existing. Can we conceive of it as not being? We cannot. No intelligent being can form such a conception. Of this everyone is perfectly conscious. When we have conceived of the annihilation of this, and of all other bodies, of the entire universe itself, let any one attempt to conceive of the annihilation of space, in which we necessarly conceive of all these objects as existing, and he will find the formation of such a conception, an absolute impossibility. The idea of space then is necessary. We conceive of the object of that idea as existing, with the impossibility of conceiving of its non-existence.
Other characteristics of these two Ideas.
It now remains to mark other characteristics of these important ideas. The following may be presented as the most fundamental.
Idea of Body relative.
When we conceive of a body as existing, we necessarily conceive, as the condition of its existence, of the existence of something else, to wit, space in which body does and must exist. If body is, space must be, as the condition of its existence. The idea of body, therefore, is relative, that is, the existence of the object of that idea necessarily supposes, as the condition of its existence, the existence of something else.
Idea of Space absolute.
When, on the other hand, we conceive of space, we conceive, as the condition of its existence, of no other reality. Space must be, whether anything else exists or not. The idea of space then is unconditioned, or absolute. The reality of the object of that idea, supposes, as the condition of its existence of nothing else.
Idea of Body implies that of Limitation.
We always, also, conceive of body as limited. Under this condition, we not only conceive of all particular bodies, but of the universe itself. The idea of body then always implies that of limitation. In other words body is finite.
Idea of Space implies the absence of Limitation.
Space, on the other hand, we always necessarily conceive of as without limits. Its idea implies the absence of all limitation. In other words, space is infinite.
Idea of Body, a sensible representation.
Once more, when we form a conception of some body, we can readily conceive of something else, by which the former can be represented. The human countenance, for example, can be represented on canvass. The idea of body then, is a sensible representation.
Idea of Space as pure rational conception.
When, on the other hand, we have formed the idea of space we find, and can conceive of, no existence with which the former can be compared. It bears no resemblace whatever to any other object which we know, or of which we can form any conception. The idea of space has no more resemblance to any other thought, or mental phenomena whatever. The idea of space is a pure rational conception.
The following then may be stated, as the most important characteristics of these two ideas.
1. The idea of body is contingent. That of space is necessary.
2. The idea of body is relative. That of space is unconditioned and absolute.
3. The idea of body implies that of limitation. Or, body is finite. The idea of space implies the absence of all limitation. In other words, space is infinite.
4. The idea of body is is a sensible representation. That of space is a pure rational conception.
IDEAS OF SUCCESSION, AND TIME, OR DURATION.
These ideas are in all intelligent minds. No individual, whose Intelligence has been developed at all, will fail to understand you, when you speak of one event, as having happened; of another, as having succeeded it, and of the fact that that succession took place in some definite period of time. We will now mark the characteristic of these ideas.
Idea of Succession contingent.
You can conceive of some one event as having happened, and of another as having succeeded it. In other words, you have the idea of succession. Can you not conceive, that neither of these events occurred? Every individual can readily form such a conception. The same holds true of all events, of all succession of every kind, and in all time. The idea of succession, like that of body, is contingent.
The Idea of Time necessary.
But when we have conceived of the total cessation of succession, we find it absolutely impossible to conceive that there is no time, or duration, in which succession may take place. We can no more conceive of the annihilation of time, than we can of that of space. The idea of time, then, like that of space, is necessary.
Other Characteristics of these Ideas.
When we conceive of succession, we necessarily affirm, as the condtion of its existence, the reality of something else, that is, of time, in which succession takes place. The idea of succession, like that of body, is relative.
On the other hand, when we affirm the reality of time, we suppose, as the condtion of its existence, the existence of nothing else. Time is, and must be, whether anything else exists of not. The idea of time, then, is unconditioned and absolute.
Once more; whenever we can conceive of succession, we necessaritly conceive of time before, and after it. The idea of succession, therefore, implies of that limitation, or succession is limited, finite.
The idea of time, however, implies the absence of all limitation. Duration never began; nor will it ever cease to be. In other words, time is infinite. The following are the most important and fundamental characteristics of these two ideas.
1. The idea of succession is contingent. That of time is necessary.
2. The idea of succession is conditioned, or relative. That of time is unconditioned and absolute.
3. The idea of succession always implies that of limitation. Or succession is finite. The idea of time, on the other hand, implies that of the absence of all limitation. In other words, duration is infinite.
IDEAS OF THE FINITE AND OF THE INFINITE.
Body and space, succession and duration, are given to us, as we have seen, with the following characteristics: Body and succession are limitable; time and space are illimitable. In other words, the former are finite, the latter are infinite. "Now the ideas of the finite and the infinite," as remarked by Cousin, "may be detached form the ideas of body and succession, time and space, provided we keep in mind the subjects from which they are abstracted."
These ideas then are in the mind. They are also distinct, the one from the other. Consequently the one cannot be derived from the other. The multiplication of the finite cannot give the infinite. Nor by dividing the infinite do we find the finite. Being correlative terms, the one necessarily supposes and suggests the other. The one cannot possibly exist in the mind without the other. Yet as above remarked, the one is perfectly distinct from the other.
Nor is one of these ideas less distinct than the other. When I speak of the inifinite, every one as readily and distinctly apprehends my meaning, as when I speak of the finite. The following propostions, for example~body is limitable; space is illimitable~are equally intelligible to all minds, the one as the other.
There are other forms in which these ideas appear in the Mind, in all of which they sustain, to each other, the same relations, and possess the same characteristics. When the Mind conceives of power, wisdom or goodness, as imperfect, or limitable, or finite, it necesssarily conceives of something which is and always was.
If an idividual still affirms that he has, in reality, no idea of the infinite, we have only to ask him, whether he understands the import of the words he employs, when he makes such an affirmation? whether he is not conscious of speaking of something, which, in thought, he himself clearly distinguishes from all that is limitable, or limited? These questions, he will readily answer in the affirmative. In this answer he clearly contradicts the affirmation under consideration. For, if he really, as he affirms, has no idea of the infinite, he would not know the meaning of the terms he uses, nor could he in thought clearly distinguish the infinite, from all that is limitable, or finite.
If also we have no real or positive idea of the infinite, we can have none of time and space, for they are positive ideas, and their objects are given in the Intelligence, as positively or absolutely infinite.
Remarks of Locke.
Four remarks of Locke, pertaining to the idea of the Infinite, demand a passing notice.
His first remark is, that it is an "endlessly growing idea." On the other hand, the idea of the Infinite is always fixed. Being a simple idea, it must, when once generated in the mind, remain there, at all times, one and identical. It may become more and more vivid. In the respect under consideration, howerver, this idea undergoes no modification whatever. Whoever found, since the ideas of infinite space and duration were developed in his Mind, that these have undergone the least modification, as far as growth is concerned?
Again: Locke maintains that the idea of the Infinite is obscure. Still it exists, and as a phenomenon of Consciousness, falls, most legitimately, under the cognizance of the philosopher. But in what sense is this idea obscure? To those faculties of the Intelligence which pertain to the finite, it must for ever remain obscure. To that faculty, however, which apprehends truths necessary and absolute, it is as plain as any other idea whatever.
According to Locke, also, the idea of the infinite is merely a negative idea. "We have," he says, "no positive idea of Infinity." This is directly contradicted by the testimony of universal Consciousness. Who is not conscious that his ideas of God, of space, and time, all of which are given in the Intelligence as infinite, are just as positive as any of our conceptions whatever. We might also, with the same propriety, maintain that our conceptions of the finite are negative, as that our ideas of the infinite are. Being correlative ideas, if one is assumed as positive, the other will be relatively negative of course. In themselves, however, both are alike positive and equally so.
Once more: "Number," says Locke, "affords the clearest idea of the infinite." This is to reduce the infinite to the finite; for number, however large, is always limited~that is, finite. The multiplication of the finite may call into exercise the faculty which apprehends the infinite, and thus render our ideas of the latter more distinct and vivid (as all acts of attention do) than it otherwise would be. In no other sense, however, can such repetitions give us the Infinite.
Characteristics of these Ideas.
Having establised the fact, that the idea of the infinite, as well as the finite, is in the mind, it now remains to mark their respective characteristics.
Idea of the Finite contingent and relative; that of the Infinite necessary and absolute.
Whatever substance we conceive of as finite, we cannot but regard as existing contingently. We cannot regard it as in its own nature, a necessary existence. Hence, for all that we conceive of as finite, we natrually and necessarily inquire after a cause. We do not ask the question, had it a cause? but what caused it? An idea of the finite, therefore, is contingent, and consequently relative.
On the other hand, whatever we regard as infinite we necessarily apprehend as uncaused~that is, as existing by necessity. When we trace back any chain of causes and effects, for the purpose of finding a first cause, at each successive link we always inquire for its antecedent, till we arrive at the Infinite. Here we pause; here our inquiries cease; here we recognize ourselves at once, as in the presence of an existence which is not contingent, but necessary and absolute. The idea of the Infinite, therefore, is necessary and absolute.
IDEAS OF MENTAL PHENOMENA, AND OF PERSONAL IDENTITY.
Every individual believes, that he is now the same being that he was yesterday, and will be to-morrow. Numberless and ever varying phenomena are constantly passing under the eye of Consciousness. Many are recalled of which we were formerly conscious; yet they are all referred to the same individaul subject. Every phenomena of thought, feeling, and willing, of which we are now conscious, which we recall as having, in some former period, been conscious of, or which we expect to put forth in some future time, is given in the Intelligence in this exclusive form~I think, I feel, I will; I did think, I did feel, I did will, so and so. The same holds equally true of all similar phenomena which we contemplate, as about to occur in future time. Whatever the phenomena may be, the same identical I is given as its subject. This is what is meant by personal identity. It is the unity of our being, of the I or self, as opposed to the pluarlity and ever changing phenomena of Consciousness. Having shown that the idea of mental phenomena and of personal identity are in the Mind, we will consider their characteristics.
Idea of Mental Phenomena contingent and relative.
You have a Consciousness of some thought, feeling, or act of Will. You remember similar phenomena of which you were formerly conscious. You conceive of them as now being, or as having been actual realities. Can you not conceive of them as not being, or as never having taken place? You can. Can you conceive of such phenomena as existing or having existed, without refering them to some subject? In other words, can you conceive of some thought, feeling, or volition as now existing, or as having existed in former times, without referring it to some subject, some being which thinks, feels, or wills? You cannot. All the phenomena of Consciousness are contingent and relative.
Idea of Personal Identity necessary.
How is it with the idea of personal identity? You are now conscious of some thought, or feeling, or act of Will. You recall others, of a similar nature, of which you have been formerly conscious. This you refer to one and the same subject, the I of Consciousness, as it is sometimes called. This reference you and all mankind alike must make. This reference mankind universally make in all the transactions of life. Under its influence we hold ourselves and others bound to fulfill contracts made years ago. Under its influence, the virtuous are commended and rewarded, and the vicious blamed and punished for actions long since performed. Under its influence we anticipate the retributions of eternal justice in a future state for the deeds done in the body. Is it possible to avoid making this reference? It is not. You cannot possibly conceive of a thought, for example, without referring it to some subject which thinks. You cannot be conscious of any mental phenomenon, or recall any others of which you were not formerly conscious, without referring them to one and the same subject, yourself. The idea of personal identity, then, is necessary.
Necessary ideas distinguished as conditional and unconditional.
Here an important distiction between necessary ideas demands special attention. When we contemplate the ideas of space and duration, for example, we find that the objects of these ideas must exist, whether anything else exists or not. Those ideas, therefore, are not only necessary, but unconditioned and absolute. On the other hand, the ideas of personal identity, and of subjstance and cause, which we shall hearafter consider, are not, in this sense necessary. They are only conditionally necessary. Phenomena being given, substance must be. An event being given, the supposition of a cause is necessary. Phenomena and events not being given, we do not affirm the existence of substances or causes. The penomena of Consciousness not being given, we do not affirm the reality or identity of the self, the subject of thses phenomena. Such ideas are conditionally necessary, and not like those of space and time, not only necessary, but unconditioned and absolute.
IDEAS OF PHENOMENA AND SUBSTANCE.
Idea of substance explained.
If the observations which have been made upon the idea of personal identity, have been distinctly understood, the characteristics of the idea of substance will be readily apprehended. All the phenomena of Consciousness and Memory are, as we have seen, by a necessary law of our being, referred to one and the same subject. The phenomena are accidents, perpetually changing. The subject, however, remains the same. Now, in the language of Cousin, "Being, one and identical, opposed to variable accidents, to transitory pheneomena, is substance." But thus far we have only pesonal substance. The same principle, however, applies equally to all external substances. Through the medium of our senses, such objects are given to us as being possessed of a great variety of qualities, and as existing in a great variety of states. The qualities and states, which are perpetually varying, we necessarily refer to one and the same subject a subject which remains one and identical, amid the endlessly diversified phenomena which it exhibits. This is substance.
Idea of phenomena contingent and relative~that of Substance necessary.
Now as it is with our ideas of phenomena of Consciousness and personal identity, so it is with our ideas of external phenomena and external substance. The former is contingent and relative; the latter is necessary. When any phenomena appears, we can readily conceive that it had not appeared. Its appearance also we can admit, only on the supposition of something else, to wit, substance, to which this appearance is necessarily referred. Our ideas of phenomena, therefore, are contingent and relative.
On the other hand, the idea of substance, relatively to phenomena, is necessary. Phenomena being given, substance must be. It is impossible for us to conceive of the former without the latter.
Our ideas of Substance not obscure, but clear and distict.
According to Locke, "we have no clear idea of substance in general." This idea also, he represents, as "of little use in philosophy." In reply, it may be said, that our idea of substance is just as clear and important, as those of time and space, and personal identity. Of this every one is conscious. The same function of the Intelligence which aprehends one of these ideas, apprehends them all. Take away the power to apprehend one, and the power to apprehend every other of these ideas is annihilated. Philosophy itself also becomes an impossibility. How could we reason philosophically about ourselves, in the absence of the idea of personal identity. Equally impossible would it be, to reason about objects external to us, in the absence of the idea of substance. This as kindred ideas, instead of being "of little use in philosophy," are, in reality, the foundation of all our explanations of phenomena, external and internal.
We often hear individuals, in expatiating upon the great ignorance of man, affirming, that all we "know of realities in and around us, is their phenomena. Of the substances themselves, we know nothing." In reply to such rhapsodies, it may be said, that our knowledge of every substance of every kind, is just as clear, distinct, and extensive, as our knowledge of its phenomena. In phenomena, substances stand revealed, the substance being as its phenomena. In the phenomena of thought, for example, we know ourselves, as thinking beings, or substances, our powers being as the thoughts which they generate. Our knowledge of the powers of thought, is just as distinct as that of thought itself. The same holds true, in respect to all substances, material, and mental.
IDEAS OF EVENTS AND CAUSE.
The universe within and around us, presents the constant spectacle of endlessly diversified and ever changing phenomena. Some of these are constantly conjoined, in the relation of "immediate and invariable antecedence and consequence." The connection between others is only occasional. In reference to events of the former class, the mind judges, that the relaton between them is not only that of antecedence and consequence, but of cause and effect. In reference to every event, however, whether its antecedent is perceived or not, we judge that it had a cause. This judgment is universal, extending to all events, actual and conceivable. It is absolutely impossible for us to conceive of an event without a cause. Let any one make the effort to form such a conception, and he will find that he has attempted an impossibility.
Here it should be noticed, that we do not affirm that every effect has a cause. That would be mere tautology. It would be equivalent to the affirmation, that whatever is produced by a cause, is produced by a cause. All this might be true, and the proposition, every event has a cause, be false, notwithstanding.
The idea of Events contingent and relative; that of Cause necessary.
The relation between the idea of an event, and that of a cause, may be readily pointed out. Whenever the mind witnesses, or is conscious of, the occurrence of an event, it apprehends that event as contingent and relative. It might or might not have happened. There is no impossibility in making these different suppositions. The occurrence of an event also necessarily supposes something else, to wit, a cause. On the other hand, no evernt uncaused can possibly be conceived to have taken place. The idea of an event, then, is contingent and relative. The idea of cause is necessary, conditionally so, as shown above.
Theory of Dr. Brown and others.
The speculations of certain philosophers respecting the subject under consideration, here demand our attention. The relation of cause and effect, according to Dr. Brown and others, is nothing more than that of "immediate and invariable antecedence and consequence." A cause, says Dr. B. is nothing else than "an immediate and invariable antecedent." According to this philosopher, in no instance whatever is there any reason, in the nature of any particular cause, why it should produce one event rather than another. Succession, mere antecedence and consequence immediate and invariable, without any reason in the nature of the antecedent and consequent why this order of succession should arise, rather than another, is all that exists in any instance. In regard to this theory, it is enough to say that no man does or can believe it. Let any man, for example, behold a piece of wood and a metallic substance put together into a heated furnace. The wood is immediately consumed, and the metal changed from a solid to a fluid state. Can he avoid the conviction, that there is, in the nature of these two substances a reason, why, that when acted upon by the same cause, one is comsumed, and the other changed from a solid to a fluid state? When the Almighty said, "Let there be light, and there was light," who dares believe that there was not, in the nature of that fiat, a reason, why, as its consequent, light rather than any other substance, should appear? When two pounds weight are place on one side of a balance, and five on the other, who does not believe, that aside from the particular sequence which follows here, there is, in the circumstances supposed, a reason why one particular sequence should follow, rather than any other? In the succession of day and night, also, we have an order of sequence immediate and invariable. Is this equivalent to the declaration, that day cause night, or night causes the day? It would be so, if the theory under consideration was true. For all the conditions of that theory are here fulfilled. We have an order of sequence immediate and invariable.
As further illustration, let us, for a moment, consider the theory of "pre-established harmony" between the action of the Soul and Body, proclaimed by Leibnitz. According to this author, Matter and Mind do, and can exert no influence upon each other, whatever. I will, for example, a motion of my arm, or of any other part of the body, and the motion follows. Still my volitions have no influence in causing or controlling that motion. So in all other instances. God, forseeing the states of our minds, has so constituted our bodies, that the action of the latter shall always be in perfect harmony with that of the former, though wholly uninflenced by it. In this theory, the relation of cause and effect, as announced by the theory of Dr. Brown, is perfectly fulfilled. Between the states of our minds, and the corresponding action of our bodies, we have an order of sequence immediate and invariable. But who does not regard the Liebnitzian theory as announcing a relation totally distict and opposite to what is universally believed to exist between our minds and bodies? When we say, that the motion of the body is in immediate and perfect harmony with that of the mind, we say one thing. When we say, that the action of the mind causes that of the body, we introduce, in the judgment of all men, an entirely different idea. Sequence immediate and invariable is all that we perceive to exist between any antecedent and consequent; but it is, by no means, all that we believe, yea know to exist.
Observations on Mr. Dugald Stewart.
The following remarks of Mr. Steward also demand a passing observation:
"It seems now to be pretty generally agreed among philosophers, that there is no instance in which we are able to perceive a necessary connection between two successive events, or to comprehend in what manner the one preceeds from the other, as its cause. From experience, indeed, we learn, that there are many events, which are constantly conjoined, so that one invariably follows the other: but it is possible, for anything we know to the contrary, that this connection, though a constant one, as far as our observation has reached, may not be a necessary connection; nay, it is possible, that there may be no necessary connections among any of the phenomena we see; and if there are any such connections existing, we may rest assured that we shall never be able to discover them."
Again:
"When it is said, that every change in nature indicates the operation of a cause, the word cause expresses something which is supposed to be necessarily connected with the change, and without which it could not have happened. This may be called the metaphysical meaning of the word; and such causes may be called metaphysical or efficient causes. In natural philosophy, however, when we speak of one thing being the cause of another, all that we mean is, that the two are constantly conjoined, so that when we see the one, we may expect the other. These conjunctions we learn from experience alone; and, without an acquaintence with them, we could not accommodate out conduct to the established course of nature."
These remarks certainly cannot hold in regard to the primary qualities of matter, as, for example, solidity considered as the antecedent, and resistacne as the consequent. Is it possible to conceive of the existence of an object which is extended and solid, which is at the same time destitute of the power of resistance?
Here I would drop the suggestion, whether it is possible to conceive of any substance as existing, which is destitute of power; and whether our ideas of substance and of power are not, in fact, identical? For my own part, I find it impossible to conceive of substances which are not actual causes or real powers.
IDEA OF POWER
The idea of Power, is that of causation in its quiescent state, or as the permanent attribute of a subject irrespective of its action, at any particular moment. When particular effects are attributed to particular causes, while the nature of the substances containing such causes remain unchanged, the mind considers the power to repeat such effects under the same circumstances, as the permanent attributes of those substances. This is the idea of power, as it exists in all minds. All substances, in their active state, are Causes~in their quiescent state, are Powers. Powers are of two kinds, active and passive. The latter are commonly called susceptibilities. As the existence of powers and causes is indicated by their respective phenomena, so the nature of such powers and causes is indicated by the characteristics of their respective phenomena.
The idea of Power, sustaining, as it does, the same relation to phenomena, that of cause and substance do, is, of course, like those ideas, universal and necessary.
Conclusion of the present Analysis.
Here our analysis of intellectual phenomena will close, for the present. It might have been extended to almost any length. Enough has been said, however, to indicate the principle of classification adopted, and to show its universal applicability, as well as to lay the foundation for the important distictions, &c., in respect to the intellectual powers, an elucidation of which will be commenced in the next Chapter.
CHAPTER IV.
APPLICATION OF THE PRECEDING ANAYSIS.
LOGICAL AND CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF IDEAS.
IN applying the results of the preceding analysis, one of the first questions which arises, respects the relations of intellectual phenomena, contingent and necessary to each other. With regard to this question, I would remark, that there are two, and only two important relations wich such phenomena sustain to each other~the relation of logical and chronological antecedence and consequence. The latter relates to the order of acquisition, or to the question, Which, in the order of time, is first developed, in the Intelligence. The former relates to their order in a logical point of view, that is, to the question, Which sustains to the other, in the process of ratiocination, the relation of logical antecedent.
Logical order.
In regard to the order last mentioned, I would remark that one idea is the logical antecedent of another, when the latter necessarily supposes the former, that is, when the reality of the object of the latter can be admitted, only on the admission, of that of the object of the former. The ideas of events and cause being given in the Intelligence, for example, we find that we can admit the reality of an event on one supposition only, to wit, that of a cause which produced the event. We say, therefore, that the idea of cause is the logical antecedent of that of events.
Now, if we contemplate ideas in this view, it wll be perceived at once, that necessary ideas are, in all instances, the logical antecedents of contingent ones. What was shown above to be true of the ideas of events and cause, is self evidently true of the ideas of body and space, succession and time, the finite and the infinite, and phenomena external and internal, and substance and personal identity. Every contingent idea is relative, necessarily supposing, as its logical antecedent, some necessary idea.
Chronological order.
Contingent ideas, on the other hand, are the chronological antecedents of necessary ideas, that is, in the order of actual development in the intelligence, the former precedes the latter. Two conciderations will render this proposition demonstrably evident.
1. Necessary ideas are given in the Intelligence, only as the logical antecedents of contingent ones. Space, for example, is known to us, only as that in which bodies or substances exist. In no other light can we possibly know or conceive of it. Now that which is and can be known to us, only as the place of some other thing, cannot have been known to us prior to that thing; otherwise, the former might be known and conceived of, irrespective of the latter. The same holds true of the ideas of succession and time, phenomena and substance, events and causes. The latter class of ideas can be conceived of, only as the logical antecedents of the former. The former therefore must have orginated in the Intelligence, prior to the latter.
2. While necessary ideas can be defined, only as the logical antecedents of contingent ones, the latter can be defined without any reference to the former~a fact which could not be true, if the latter were not the chronological antecedents of the former. Cause, for example, can be defined, only as that which produces events. An event, as any one can perceive by consulting his dictionary, can be, and is defined without any reference to the idea of cause. Contingent ideas therefore are the chronological antecedents of necessary ones.
PRIMARY INTELLECTUAL FACULTIES PRE-SUPPOSED BY THE PRECEDING ANALYSIS.
The preceding analysis has fully prepared us to proceed legitimately and safely to another very important inquiry~the Primary Intellectual Faculties pre-supposed in that analysis. As stated in the Introduction, the being and characteristics of every power or substance in existence, are indicated to us by its respective phenomena. The perception of such phenomena, being itself a phenomenon of the mind which perceives, supposes, in the mind, corresponding powers of perception. When the Intelligence apprehends a fact, or truth of any kind, such act implies, in the Intelligence, corresponding powers of apprehension. Now truths perceived by the Intelligence are, as we have seen, of two kinds, contingent and necessary. The perception of such truths indicates a corresponding distiction of intellectual functions, or powers. The faculty or faculties which perceive, and affirm the reality of contingent phenomena, are clearly distinguishable from that which affirms the reality of truths necessary and universal.
But contingent phenomena perceived by the Intelligence are distinguishable, with equal clearness, as objective and subjective, that is, part pertain to the Mind itself, and part to external material substances. These facts most obviously demand a two-fold division of the Intellectual faculties which pertain to contingent phenomena, as objective and subjective. The analysis completed in the last Chapter, presents to our contemplation three distinct faculties of the Intelligence:
1. That which perceives the phenomena of the mind itself, the faculty which gives us subjective phenomena. This function of the Intelligence is denominated Consciousness.
2. That faculty which perceives the phenomena of external material substances, or which gives us objective phenomena. This function of the Intelligence is denominated Sense.
3. That faculty which apprehends truths necessary and universal. This intellectual function, or faculty, is denominated Reason.
These Faculties why called Primary.
Consciousness, Sense, and Reason, are called the primary faculties of the Intelligence, for two considerations:
1. Because, that with them, all our knowledge commences.
2. All our complex cognitions are composed of elements given by these faculties. All the phenomena of the Intelligence are either simple or complex. All simple ideas are found to be the direct intuitions of one or of the other of the faculties. All complex ideas are found, on a careful analysis to be composed of elements previously given by these faculties. The truth of this last remark will be fully confirmed in the precess of our subsequent investigations.
Also called Intuitive Faculties.
The faculties above named are also sometimes denominated Intuitive Faculites. The reason is, that each alike, pertains to its objects, by direct intuition. Consciousness, for example, by direct intuition, and not through any medium, apprehends the phenomena of the mind. The same is true of the faculty of Sense in respect to the phenomena of external material substances. The action of Reason is conditioned on the prior action of Sense and Consciousness. It is not through any medium, but by direct intuition, however, that Reason affirms truths universal, necessary, and absoluto. Like the former, therefore, it may, with equal propriety, be denominated a faculty of intuition. These faculties, as we shall see hereafter, give us the elements of all our knowledge.
RELATION OF PRIMITIVE INTUITIVE FACULTIES TO EACH OTHER
We are now prepared also for another very important inquiry — the appropriate spheres of the primary faculties relatively to each other. This inquiry can now be met in very few words. Sense, and Consciousness, give us phenomena external and internal. Reason gives us the logical antecedents of phenomena thus perceived and affirmed. This is its appropriate and exclusive sphere relatively to the other faculties. It cannot enter the domain of either Sense or Consciousness, and judge of the validity of its affirmations. The same holds true of each of these last-mentioned faculties, relatively to the domain of the other, and that of Reason too. Each faculty has its own exclusive sphere in which it is wholly independent of either or both of the others, and independent in this sense, that the validity of its affirmations cannot be tested at the bar of either of the others. Its response, when questioned, in respect to what it has affirmed is, " What I have written, I have written." When Sense, for example, has made an affirmation pertaining to the phenomena of an external material substance, all that Consciousness can do, pertaining to the subject, is, to give that affirmation as it is, together with its characteristics.
Of the validity, of the affirmation, it can say nothing. Reason can give the logical antecedent of that affirmation, and that is all. With its validity it has no more to do, than Consciousness has. The same will hereafter be shown to be true of Reason, in respect to every other function of the Intelligence.
IMPORTANCE OF THE TRUTHS ABOVE ELUCIDATED.
If the truth of the conclusions above stated be admitted, they will be found to be of fundamental importance in philosophy. They will put an end at once to the wild speculations of many philosophers of the Super-sensual school, both in thins country and, in Europe. hero lies, for example, the great error of' Kant, the father of modern Transcendentalism. He first gives us a most profound, and correct analysis of intellectual phenomena, together with a statement equally correct, of the faculties pre-supposed by those phenomena. He then arraigns all the other faculties at the bar of Reason, there to test the validity of their affirmations. It is no matter of surprise at all, that the result of the trial should be thus announced by the philosopher himself who instituted it, a trial, the entire results of which, as we shall hereafter see, and a moment's reflection must convince us, must and can rest upon nothing else than groundless assumptions, and not at all upon the real affirmations of the Intelligence. "We have therefore intended to say," says Kant, in giving the results of his philosophy, "that all our intuition is nothing but the representation of phenomenon — that the things which we invisage [form conceptions and judgments of] are not that in themselves for which we take them; neither are their relationships in themselves so constituted as they appear to us; and that if we do away with our subject, or even only the subjective quality of the senses in general, every quality, all relationships of objects in space and time, nay, even space and time themselves would , and cannot exist as phenomena in themselves, but only in us. It remains utterly unknown to us what may be the nature of the objects in themselves, separate from all the receptivity of our sensibility. We know noting our manner of perceiving them, which is peculiar to us and which need not belong to every being, although to every man. With this we have only to do." The above extract contains the following strange paralogisms, contradictions and absurdities:
1. That our Intelligence takes, that is, affirms things not to be, what the same Intelligence takes, that is, affirms them to be. Kant first employs the Intelligence to find out what things are. He then employs the same Intelligence to demonstrate, that. these very things are not what the Intelligence had previously affirmed them to be. As if a merchant should profess, that by his yard-stick, he had demonstrated, that he had a thousand yards of cloth, and then, that, by the same yard-stick, lie had as fully demonstrated the fact, that he had no real cloth at all, and that neither the yard-stick nor the cloth were, in themselves, what the yard-stick had shown them to be.
2. That, while our Intelligence represents nothing whatever as it is in itself, this same Intelligence does correctly represent "our manner of perceiving objects" — a most palpable contradiction, surely. For if our Intelligence does not represent timings as they are, it surely will not represent our "our manner of perceiving" as it is.
3. Kant affirms, that all that we have to do with objects, is '' according to our manner of perceiving them,'' that is, as they are given, in our Intelligence, lie then teaches us, that these objects are not as our Intelligence affirms them to be. This, certainly, is doing with objects far otherwise than "according to our manner of perceiving them."
Now all these absurdities and contradictions which Kant gives as the results of' his philosophy, and which constitute its distinguishing peculiarities, would have been prevented, together with the tide of skepticism, which, through that philosophy, has desolated so large a portion of Europe, had that great philosopher, after demonstrating the reality of Reason, as a faculty of the Intelligence, raised, and correctly answered, the inquiry pertaining to the true sphere of that faculty relatively to other functions of the Intelligence. Philosophers of the Super-sensual school have run wild with Reason, just as those of the Sensual school did with Sensation and Reflection.
The possession of Reason is the great distinguishing characteristic of humanity, that characteristic which separates man at an infinite remove from the lower orders of creation around him, and places. him among the great Intelligences of the universe. The full demonstration of Reason, as a function of. the Intelligence, has placed the philosopher whom Coleridge not unappropriately denominates the "venerable sage of Koningsburg," among the brightest intellectual luminaries of earth. When the appropriate sphere of this divine faculty in man, relatively to the action of the other functions of the Intelligence shall be fully settled, then philosophy, instead of being the sport of wild and blind assumptions, will stand unmoved upon the rock of eternal truth. This subject will be resumed. again in a subsequent part of our investigations.
CLASSIFICATION OF INTELLECTUAL PHENOMENA GIVEN BY
KANT.
It was stated above, that Kant has given a most profound and correct analysis of intellectual phenomena, together with a development equally correct of the intellectual faculties presupposed by those phenomena. I will close this chapter by giving a concise statement of the results of his analysis.
Intellectual phenomena, according to this philosopher, are divided into two classes—those derived from experience, and those not derived from experience— the empirical and rational.
The operations of our own minds, for example, together with the qualities of external material substances, are given us by the direct intuitions of Sense and Consciousness. Such intuitions, therefore, are exclusively empirical, being derived solely from experience.
On the other hand, space is an object neither of Sense nor Consciousness. Its reality we know, and know absolutely; but not as an object of experience. The same is true of the ideas of Time, the Infinite, Substance, Cause and Effect, &c.
Rational intuitions are by Kant denominated "intuitions a priori." Events, for example, are objects of experience; as such we know them. But the proposition, every event has a cause, we know a priori, and not by experience.
Intuitions a priori, have these characteristics, and by these they are distinguished from empirical intuitions, viz. : universality and necessity. Though we might know by experience, that such and such events have a particular cause, we cannot know from experience, that every event has a cause; much less, that every event must have a cause. Experience, if it could give us what is, could not give us the fact that what is, must be.
The above classification, it will readily be perceived, is, in reality, identical with that elucidated in the preceding Chapter, and leads to precisely the same division of the Intellectual faculties, a division which Kant, in fact, presents, as the. result of his investigations. The " a priori" phenomena of Kant are those there given as necessary, while his empirical intuitions are the contingent phenomena of Sense and Consciousness.
CHAPTER V.
CONSCIOUSNESS.
CONSCIOUSNESS DEFINED.
OF this function of the Intelligence various definitions have bccn given by different philosophers. The following is the definition given by Dr. Webster. "The knowledge of sensations and mental operations, or of what passes in our own mind; the act of the mind which makes known an internal object." Cousin represents it as that function of the Inte1igence which "gives us information of everything which takes place in the interior of our minds." "Perhaps the most correct description of the mind in Consciousness, i. e., of the conscious states of the mind," says the translator of Cousin's Psychology, "is the being aware of the phenomena of the mind—of that which is present to the mind and if self-consciousness be distinguished, not in genera, but as. a special determination of Consciousness, it is the being aware of ourselves, as of the me, in opposition to the not me, or as the permanent subject, distinct from the phenomena of the mind, and from all outward causes of them." In simple Consciousness, according to this author, we have a knowledge, in conformity to the statement of Cousin, of whatever passes in the interior of our own minds, that is, of all our mental exercises. In self-consciousness, which is only a special form or determination of the former, we know ourselves in those phenomena, and thus distinguish ourselves from all external causes of them. This, certainly, is a very distinct and correct exposition of the subject.
The definition of Professor Tappan, given in his work on the Will, though somewhat lengthy, demands special attention, on account of the distinctness and correctness with which the subject is there presented.
"Consciousness," he says, "is the necessary knowledge which 'the mind has of its own operations. In knowing, it knows that it knows. In experiencing emotions and passions, it knows it experiences them. In willing, or exercising acts of causality, it knows that it wills or exercises such acts. This is common, universal, and spontaneous Consciousness.
"This definition may appear to some an identical proposition — the mind knows its knowledges, the mind knows its emotions, the mind knows its acts of causality, may seem to be implied, if not affirmed, when we say, the mind knows, feels, and wills. Therefore, we would say further:
"By Consciousness more nicely and accurately defined, we mean the power and act of self-recognition: not, if you please, the mind knowing its knowledges, emotions, and volitions; but the mind knowing itself in these."
In the above definitions the subject is presented with such distinctness, and correctness, that I shall attempt no particular definition of my own. In the exercise of Consciousness, we are not only aware of some mental state, or exercise, but we know ourselves, in that state, as the subjects of it. In every exercise of thought, feeling, and willing, we not only know what these states arc, but know ourselves in them, as exercising them, and as the subjects of them. hence all mental phenomena, as given in Consciousness, are expressed in propositions like the following : — I think, I feel, I will ; — the mental phenomena being given, together with the self, the I, as the subject of them.
A remark, which I deem of special importance to make here, is this: In Consciousness, we not only know mental phenomena as they are, but what is in reality implied in such knowledge; we know also the fundamental and distinguishing characteristics of such phenomena. If we could merely know, by Consciousness, mental-phenomena, and not also their distinguishing characteristics, we could never classify and arrange such phenomena as the basis of important conclusions in the science of Mind. Whatever intelligent affirmations we can make respecting ourselves, as beings capable of thinking,, feeling, and willing, we must affirm, on the exclusive authority of the characteristics of such phenomena, characteristics perceived and affirmed by Consciousness.
SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS CONDITIONED ON REASON, BUT NOT A FUNCTION OF REASON;
The exercise of Self- Consciousness, contemplated as a particular form or determination of Simple Consciousness, is conditioned on the prior exercise of the Reason. It is' by Reason, as we have already seen, that we know that phenomenon supposes substance, or a subject, and that each particular phenomenon supposes a particular subject. 'But for Reason, therefore, whatever mental phenomena might be given 'in Consciousness, we could not know, that, for such phenomena, any subject whatever is supposed. Simple Consciousness gives us mental phenomena. Self-Consciousness, a particular form, or determination of the former, connects such phenomena with the subject, the reality of which Reason has affirmed, and connects them in the propositions, IL think, I feel, I will, &c. While, therefore, Self-Consciousness is conditioned on the Reason, the former, as a function of the Intelligence, is clearly distinguishable from the latter. This is further evident from a single consideration. Reason is the organ of a priori, that is, universal and necessary truths. This is its exclusive sphere. All the affirmations of Consciousness, even in the form called Self-Consciousness, bear the characteristic of contingency. A sound philosophy, therefore, will not fail, as philosophers sometimes have done, to distinguish these different functions of the Intelligence from each other.
NATURAL, OR SPONTANEOUS, AND PHILOSOPHICAL OR REFLECTIVE CONSCIOUSNESS.
Consciousness, in its simple spontaneous form, is common to all mankind, in the natural development of their Intelligence. In the language of Cousin, it is, "in all men a natural process." Every individual is accustomed to use the propositions, I think, I feel, I will, &c. All persons are accustomed, also, to speak of themselves, as conscious of particular states, or exercises of mind. This shows, that they not only are conscious of their mental exercises, but also are aware of the function of the Intelligence exercised under such circumstances. All men, also, in the spontaneous developments of Consciousness, clearly distinguish themselves as subjects of mental phenomena, from all external causes, or objects of the same. They may not be able technically to express this distinction with the clearness and definiteness that a philosopher would. They may not be able to understand at first, the meaning of the terms he would employ to express that distinction. Still it is, to them, a no less palpable reality, than to him.
Now Consciousness, which is thus seen to be, "in all men, a natural process, some," in the language of the philosopher above named, "elevate this natural process to the degree of an art, a method, by reflection, which is a sort of second Consciousness — a free re-production of the first; and as Consciousness gives all men an idea of what is passing in them, so reflection gives the philosopher a certain, knowledge of everything which falls under the eye of Consciousness." Reflection, or philosophic Consciousness, is simple or natural Consciousness directed by the Will, in the act of careful attention to the phenomena of our own minds. As natural Consciousness is one of the characteristics which distinguishes man from the brute, so philosophic Consciousness is the characteristic which distinguishes the mental philosopher' from the rest of mankind.
The above remarks may be illustrated by a reference to two common forms of observation in respect to external material substances. The phenomena of such substances all mankind alike notice, and to some degree reason about. It is the natural philosopher, however, who attentively observes these phenomena, for the purpose of marking their fundamental characteristics, as the basis of philosophic classification generalization; &c. The same holds true in respect to the two forms of Consciousness under consideration. Mental phenomena all men are conscious of, and all men, to a greater or less degree, are accustomed to reason about. The philosopher, however, by laborious efforts of self reflection, most critically attends to these phenomena, for the purpose of marking their characteristics, classifying and arranging them according to philosophic principles, and thus determining the powers and laws of mental operations. In simple Consciousness, we have a knowledge of whatever passes in our minds. In reflection, we have the same phenomena classified and generalized, according to fundamental characteristics thus perceived and affirmed.
PROCESS OF CLASSIFICATION AND GENERALIZATION IN REFLECTION, ILLUSTRATED.
I will now present a short illustration of this process, for the purpose of elucidating the proper method of questioning Consciousness, although in so doing I shall allude to a mental process of a secondary character, hereafter to be explained. The mind perceives, we will suppose, some object, an external material substance, denominated body. With this perception there arises the conception of the object as existing somewhere,--in space. The proposition, this body exists somewhere, or in space, falls under the eye of Consciousness. It is taken up by reflection, and by the process of abstraction, hereafter to be described, the two elements constituting the proposition are separated from each other. Thus the mind obtains two distinct ideas, that of body and space. These two ideas are now separately considered and marked with their respective characteristics of contingency and necessity. Again, some event is perceived. With this perception arises the conviction that it had a cause. The proposition, this event had a cause, falls under the eye of Consciousness. It also is taken up by reflection, and by the process above described, two new ideas, that of event and causation, marked by their respective characteristics of contingency and necessity, are obtained. These two ideas now being in the mind, by the laws of association, the other two, above referred to, are suggested and ranged with them in two distinct classes, as contingent and necessary ideas. Here we have the process of classification. Now on a further examination of the particular ideas comprehended under either of the above classes, some new characteristic common to them all, may be discovered; as, for example, all contingent ideas may be found also to have the characteristic of relative. This becomes a general fact, and we have it in the process of generalization. The Intelligence now takes up these phenomena, originally given by Consciousness, and then analyzed, arranged, and generalized by reflection, and gives us the powers and susceptibilities of the Mind, as indicated by these phenomena, &c.
FUNCTIONS OF CONSCIOUSNESS.
Such are the nature and functions of Consciousness, together with the knowledge derived through it.
1. In its original spontaneity, it gives us all the phenomena of the mind.
2. In connection with the Reason, it give us ourselves as the subjects of these phenomena, and as distinguished from all existences around us, perceived or apprehended.
3. In reflection it gives the same phenomena, analyzed, arranged, and generalized.
4. From these data, the Intelligence gives us the nature, faculties, susceptibilities, and laws of mental operation, indicated by these phenomena.
NECESSITY OF RELYING IMPLICITLY UPON THE TESTIMONY OF CONSCIOUSNESS.
In the Introduction, a proof of the possibility of mental philosophy, as a science, was attempted. On this point I shall add noting more here. I will make a few remarks upon the necessity of relying with implicit confidence upon the testimony of Consciousness, as the basis of all conclusions pertaining to the science of Mind. The great reason, as I suppose, why many individuals are prejudiced against mental philosophy, as a peculiarly difficult, obscure, and uncertain science, is a secret distrust of the validity of the facts which lie at the basis of the science; in other words, in the credibility of the witness through whom the facts are obtained. In respect to physical science, no such distrust is felt. Mankind generally rest with implicit confidence in the validity of Sense, with regard to external, material substances. With equal assurance do they, consequently, rest on any conclusions legitimately drawn from such phenomena respecting the nature and laws of the substances revealed in those phenomena. Now, why should we not repose the same faith in the validity of the testimony of Consciousness, in respect to those phenomena which constitute the basis of an infinitely more important science, the knowledge of Mind, than we do in our senses in respect to external, material phenomena? Of these two sciences, that which is by far of the highest concernment to us, we should not suppose would rest upon the most uncertain basis. If we look also at the real facts of the case, can any one tell us, or even conceive of the reason why we should rest with less assurance in the truth of that of which we are conscious, than in that which is perceived and affirmed by the external senses?
The visionary speculations, and dreamy theories of many of the most distinguished mental philosophers of ancient and modern times, has no doubt contributed (and rightly,
too, if mad speculations are the legitimate results of the principles of the science), to the impression on the minds of many, that the Scotchman's definition of Metaphysics must be the true one, to wit: "Metaphysics is, when he that is listening dinna ken what he that is speaking means, and he that is speaking dinna ken what he means himself." It should be borne in mind, however, that up to the time of Bacon, a remark precisely similar would have been equally applicable to the speculations of natural philosophers; and that while the principles of physical science have, since that period, been settled upon the right foundation, the true method in mental science is of comparatively recent development. I will here drop the suggestion, whether posterity will not regard itself as almost as much indebted to Victor Cousin for the annunciation of the true method in mental Science, as to Bacon for announcing the same in respect to physical? Mental philosophy, just emerging from the darkness of ages, seems now to have gained the high road to truth, with its laws of investigation correctly settled. If we would make sure and rapid progress, two things are indispensable--that we enter upon our investigations with implicit confidence in the validity of the facts of Consciousness, as the basis of the science of mind--and that we adhere with equally assured confidence to all conclusions to which those facts legitimately conduct us.
CONSCIOUSNESS, A DISTINCT FUNCTION OR FACULTY OF THE INTELLECT.
We are now prepared to answer the question, whether Consciousness is a distinct function, or faculty of the Intelligence? All philosophers, when speaking of it without reference to any pre-formed theory, agree in speaking of it as a function as distinct and real as any other, Sense and Reason, for example. Yet, by some, the fact that it is such a faculty has been denied. Consciousness, says the translator of Cousin's Psychology, "is not to be confounded either with the Sensibility (external nor internal) nor with the Understanding, nor with the Will; neither is it a distinct and special faculty of the Mind; nor is it the principle of any of the faculties; nor is it, on the other hand, the product of them." It would be somewhat difficult, after so many negations, to put anything very positive into a definition of the subject. Yet the learned author has himself given to this something a "local habitation and a name." "Consciousness," he says, "is a witness of our thoughts and volitions." Now as this witness has a special function distinct from every other function of the Intelligence, ought we not to conclude that it is a special function of that Intelligence?
The act of knowing also implies the power of knowledge. A knowledge unlike all other knowledges, implies a special function of knowledge, a function distinct from every other. Is not the knowledge obtained by Consciousness,
thus distinct from all other knowledges? Does it not, therefore, imply a special function distinct from every other function of the Intelligence?
Consciousness also, must be a special function, or it must be a peculiar function of some other faculty, or of the whole together. From Sense and Reason, it is as clearly distinguishable, as either of those is from the other. No one will pretend, that it is a special function of any of the secondary faculties hereafter to be named, nor of all the Intellectual faculties together. What shall we regard it then but a special function of the Intelligence?
One other consideration which I present, is, as it appears to me, quite decisive of the question under consideration. The exercise of Consciousness is dependent on the Will, in the same sense, that that of the other special functions of the Intelligence is. When, for example, an external object makes an impression upon one or more of the organs of Sense through this function, there is an instant and spontaneous apprehension of the cause of that impression. Before that cause is distinctly perceived, however, the perceptive faculty must, by a voluntary act of attention, be directed particularly to the object. The specific control which the Will thus exercises over this faculty, clearly indicates it, as a special function of the Intelligence. now a relation precisely similar, as shown above, in respect to its spontaneous, and reflective determinations, does the Will exercise over Consciousness. We have the same evidence that it is a special function of the Intelligence, that we have that Sense is.
THEORY OF DR. BROWN.
I will close my remarks upon the subject of Consciousness, by a reference to the theory of Dr. Brown in respect to it. Consciousness, according to this philosopher, is simply a general term expressive of all the phenomena or state of the mind. "Sensation," he says, for example, "is not an object of Consciousness differing from itself, but a particular sensation is the consciousness of the moment, as a particular hope, or fear, or grief, or resentment, or simple remembrance, ma be the actual consciousness of the next moment."
A single example will fully demonstrate the incorrectness of this theory. I affirm (what is actually true), to myself, or some other individual, that I am in pain. This affirmation implies three things--an apprehension of pain in general, together with that of the particular feeling referred to--and a reference of that feeling to myself as the subject, this apprehension and reference being exclusively states of the Intelligence. now this knowledge of the feeling under consideration, with its reference to myself as the subject, is an act of Consciousness; and exercise of the Intelligence which accompanies all mental states, and which differs as much from sensation, or any other state of the Sensibility, as thought differs from such states. Sensation then is an object of Consciousness differing from itself. The same holds true in respect to all mental exercises. The state itself is one thing. The knowledge of that state, and reference of it to ourselves is quite another. This last exercise of the Intelligence is Consciousness, an exercise as distinct from the state of which it takes cognizance, as that state is from the object which causes it.
MEANING OF THE TERM CONSCIOUSNESS, AS EMPLOYED BY SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON.
There is an apparent, though not real, discrepancy, if not contradiction, in the analysis of the Intellectual faculties, as given by Sir William Hamilton, and that developed in this Treatise, as far as the function of Consciousness is concerned. This discrepancy, or careful examination, however, will be found to consist, not in the analysis itself, but simply and exclusively in the use of terms, which each philosopher is permitted to employ according to his own definition. For the term Consciousness, as defined and employed in this Treatise, he substitutes that of Self-Consciousness, which, as the following paragraph will show, he uses in strict conformity to the definition above referred to. In the same paragraph also, he defines "External Perception or Perception simply," in perfect accordance with that given of the term Sense, as employed in this Treatise.
"External Perception or Perception simply, is the faculty presentative or intuitive of the Non-Ego or Matter, if there be any intuitive apprehension allowed of the Non-Ego at all. Internal Perception, as Self-Consciousness, is the faculty presentative or intuitive of the phenomena of the Ego or mind."
In a subsequent paragraph, he defines Consciousness itself, as the general faculty of Intuition. As thus defined, it would include Sense, Consciousness, and Reason, as these terms are defined and employed in this Treatise, and would differ from each of these functions of the Intelligence, only as the whole differs form each of its parts. "Consciousness," he says, "is a knowledge solely of what is now here present to the mind. It is therefore only intuitive, and its objects exclusively presentative. Again, Consciousness is a knowledge of all that is now here present to the mind: ever immediate object of cognition is thus an object of Consciousness, and every intuitive cognition itself, simply a special form of Consciousness."
When, therefore, our author affirms that we are immediately conscious of the existence of the "Non-Ego or Matter," that is, of its primary qualities, he means, not that such qualities are the immediate objects of Self-Consciousness, as he has defined the term, that is, of Consciousness as defined in this Treatise, but that they are the immediate, that is, the "presentative or intuitive" objects of the faculty of "External Perception, or Perception simply," that is, of Sense, as this function of the Intelligence is defined in this Treatise. No difference of opinion obtains, therefore, between us and our author, so far as the analysis of the primary faculties themselves of the Intelligence is concerned. The only difference, which does obtain, is in the use of terms, in respect to which even, we would not willingly depart from such authority as Sir William Hamilton, but for the fact, that a single term is needed in a Treatise like this, to express each special function of the Intelligence, that the nomenclature which we have adopted has this special advantage over that adopted by out author, and that, with all, it is equally definite, and is now very generally obtaining in mental philosophy.
CHAPTER VI.
SENSE.
SENSE has already been defined, as that Faculty or Function of the Intelligence, by which we apprehend the phenomena, or qualities [primary qualities, as we shall hereafter see] of external material substances.
As thus defined, the exercise of this faculty should be carefully distinguished from those states of the Sensibility denonimated sensations, states which always accompany external perception, but which are, notwitI~standing, none the 1cs~, for that reason, distinct from it. Sensation is that state of' the Sensibility which immediately succeeds an.y impression made by any canse 'upon the i~~yszcczl organization. Sensation is exclusively a state of the Sensibility... Sense is no less exclusively a function of the Intelligence. Of these distinctions 'we should never lose sight, when reasoning upon this departiucnt of mental science.
SPONTANEOUS AND VOLUNTARY P]~TE1tM1NAT1ON OF S}NSE.
Sense, liko C~ni~ciousness, is, in it~ pu initivo dovelopni en
a simple spontaniety of the Intelligence. Its action, in 1hi~ state, i~, in no degree, conditioned on that of the Will. l1er-ception, in it.s distinct form, is conditioned on attention, which is nothing but the perceptive faculty directed by the Will, and hence, for the want of a better term, or phrase, called the voluntary determination of the faculty. Attention in• the direction of Consciousness, that is, when directed. to mental phenomena — is called reflection. When in the direction of the faculty of external perception — that is, towards the phenomena of material substances — it is called observation. ~~-'
The necessity of observation, that is, of attention, in the voluntary direction of the perceptive faculty towards phenomena obscurely given in the spontaneous developments of that faculty, may be readily illustrated. A portion of a congregation, for example, who have been listening to a certain speaker, have fallen into a state of slumber. The speaker suddenly stops, and immediately are all aroused. Now, if tl~e audience had not, in some form, heard the voice which broke upon their ears, why were they roused? Ye1~, if inquired of, in respect to what had been spoken to them, they would, for the obvious and exclusive reason, that they had not attended to it, be wholly unable to answer. how often do we hear the remark, I gained no distinct conception of that part of a discourse. My attention happened, at,)Jlo time, to be directed to something else.
The attention may, in some instances, be so fixed upon sonic object in one direction, that the Sensibility and Intelligence both may be almost, if not quite, totally isolated from what would otherwise deeply affect us in another direction. ~ A gentleman, for example, who was employed about the ma.. chiiiery in a factory, had one of his fingers entirely cut ofF, by the sudden and unexpected starting of a portion of that macliincry which carried, with great velocity, a circular saw. So intensely did his attention instantly become occupied with the prevention of the destruction of the whole machinery, that he was not aware of the injury done to his own person, nor was he sensible of the least pain from it, till the accident was pointed out to him by another who stood by. As soon, how ever, as the injury was discovered, the pain from it became intense.
The liass of attention is the spontaneous action of the Sensibility and Intelligence — action which always occurs, when the proper conditions arc fulfilled, and whcii the mind is not isolated from objects in other directions, by its intense action upon some object (as in the case above cited), in some specific direction.
MENTAL PBOCESS IN PERCEPTION.
The process of the mind, in the perception of external objects, is ~donbtlcss originally something like this An unpression is made upon the Sensibility, or a sensation is pro-. duced, by the action of some external material object upon the physical organization. In connection with the sensation, there is a direèt and immediate spontaneous apprehension (perception), of the preseuce and quality (primary quality, as we shall hereafter sco), of tho object which caused the sensation. To this quality the attention, by an act of volition, is then directed. Thus the apprehension or perception becomes clear and distinct. Sensation always, as a matter of fact, accompanies Sense-perception. Sensation, also, is the occctsiom of the perception, but not its cause, that cause being always found in the correlation between the nature of the Intelligence, as a faculty, and that of the Non-Ego or Matter, as an object of knowledge.*
* The distinction between a condition, and a eaius of a given event is obvious, and may be readily elucidated. The removal of an obstruction may be the occasion of the descent of a heavy body towards- the earth; but it is, in no proper sense, the cause of such an occurrence, tlie principle of attraction being itself the real cause. So, in the language of Sir William Hamilton, "Sensation proper is the condition sine qua non of a perception proper of the primary qualities." The cause proper of the perception, on the other hand, is found, as said above, in the corre1ation between the nature of the Intelligence, as a faculty and of the Non-Ego or Matter as an object of perception.
OBJECTS OF PERCEPTION.
The objects of Sense-perceptions, which, as we shall hereafter show, always pertain directly and immediately to fiaid objects, are the qualities (primary or secundo-primary qualities, terms hereafter to be defined) of external material substances, qualities, such, for example, as extension, form, solidity, &c. The secondary qualities, such as those of taste, stncll, sound, &e., are apprehended indirectly and mediately, through, and iu the consciousness of sensations. Such qualities are to us the index, and the only index we have, of the nature of their respective subjects. In the consciousness of thought, feeling, and acts of will, we know ourselves, as thinking, fedflng, and acting beings. So in the consMousness of Sense-perceptions, and sensations, produced in us by external matérial substances, we know such substances as the subjects of the qualities thus perceived and apprehended.
COMMON ANT) 1'JULOSOPJ]IC DOUBTS IN RESPECT TO THE COMPARATIVE VALIDITY OF TilE ArYntMnioNS 01? SENSE ANp CONSCIOUSNESS. V
While the mass of mankind appear to exercise more con fidence, theoretically, in the testimony of Sense than in that of Consciousness, the ease seems, in many instances, to be reversed in respect to philosophers. The testimony of Consciousness the latter appear to regard as valid in respect to subjective, while that of Sense is not, in their estimation, equally MO JR respect to objective phenomena. Now the reason of the presence of these phuiosophic doubts, as Coleridge wpuld call them, in the latter instance, and of their absence in the former, arises, as I suppose, from the fact that philosophers have attempted to explain the quo moclo of external perception, and not that of internal. This is the very reason for the doubts under consideration, assigned by Coleridge himself. "As this," he says [to wit, the belief that titcie exist 1/111195 without us], "on the one hand, originates neither in grounds nor arguments, and yet, on the other hand, remains proof against all attempts to move it by grounds or arguments (natura furca c~pellas tanicu 'usque redcb~t); oil the one hand, lllyS ebb] ~ii to ii\i I~I El )IAPE certainty as lb 151 ~ al. once indemonstrable and irresistible; and yet, on the other hand, inasmuch as it refers to something essentially different from ourselves, nay, even in opposition to ourselves, leaves it inconceivable how it could possibly become a part of our immediate Consciousness (in other words, how that which is cx hypothesi continues intrinsic and alien to our being); the philosopher, therefore, compels himself to treat this faith as nothing more than a prejudice, innate indeed and connatural, but still a prejudice." Now why does this philosopher compel himself to treat as a groundless prejudice and an untruth that which himself acknowledges to be an innate, connatural belief, an irresistible affirmation of his own and of the universal Intelligence? Simply because lie cannot explain the quo modo of external perception — cannot see how an object not our~e1vcs, and wholly unlike ourselves, as matter is iitiivers:tlly conceived to be, should ho to us an object of knowledge. If that is a reason why we should compel ourselves to treat as false what we know to be true, it should certainly induce us to treat his theory as equally false. For how can we explain the manner in w'hich that which is intrinsic and a part of ourselves, should be presented to us, by our Intelligence, as wholly extrinsic and foreign, and even opposed to ourselves—how it can present that which is exclusively subjective, as wholly object ice — that which is purely spiritual, as wholly material —that, in short, which is " without form and void," as possessed of a definite form ? Tile 9U0 ~~ioclo of knowledge, according to this last theory, would be found quite as difficult of explanation as in conformity to any other whatever.
Let us now suppose that philosophers should undertake to explain the quo mac/a of knowledge by Consciousness. How, for example, can I perceive and attend to an object external to myself, and yet have, at the same time, a consciousness equally d i~1iiieL ci' the itet of peiceptiuli itself? Suppose they ~lioultl attempt to explain such mysterious acts of the Intelligence as these, and at the same time compel themselves to treat as a prejudice all mental affirmations, the mode of origination of which they cannOt explain. Would not their philosophic doubts be quite as strong in respect to the validity of Consciousness, as with regard to that of any other function of tile Intelligence ?
TIlE PROVINCE OF PhILOSOPhY.
Philosophy, it should b~~borne in mind, has to do with facts as they are, with the nature of the powers revealed in those facts, and with the laws in conformity to which those powers act. With the mode of their action, further than this, it has nothing to do. In the fall of heavy bodies to the earth, for example, we learn that attraction is a property of all mafeiial substances. \Ve then set ourselves to determine the law wliieli controls the action of this property. Here we arc within the legitimate domain of philosophy. But suppose we attempt to explain the mode in which the attractive power acts. "Such knowledge is too wonderful for us. It is high, we cannot attain unto it." Philosophy, well satisfied with her own legitimate and wide domain, resigns such things to the Eternal One, who ci~eated all the powers of tile universe, and consequently understands the mode of their action. All that philosophy can say in regard to the mode of action of any power is, that such is its nature.
COMPARATIVE VALIDITY OF THE AFFIRMATIONS OP SENSE
AND CONSCIOUSNESS.
We are now prepared to contemplate the comparative validity of the affirmations of these two functions of the Intelligence, Sense and Consciousness. I will suppose that I have a porccptioii of sonic external object, as possessed of the (IWLIitics of extension, form, and color. In Consciousness I recognize the existence of this perception as a phenomenon of iiiy own mind. Which of these affirmations are, in reality, the most valid, and which would a wise and sound philosophy impel me to esteem and treat as such — the affirmation of, Sense, in respect to the qualities of the external object, or of Consciousness, in regard to the existence and character of the affirmation of the former ~faculty, as a phenomenon of the Mind itself?, Neither, surely. Each faculty pertains alike to its object, by direct and immediate intuition. The affirmation of each is alike positive and absolute in respect to its object. The action of one is, in reality, no more a mystery than that of the other. The quo modo of the action of each is alike inexplicable, and no more inexplicable than the mode of action of every other power in existence. It is a. sage remark of Dr. Brown, when speaking of the mode in which causes produce their respective effects, that "cvci'ythtny is mysterious, or nothing is." When philosophy leads us to doubt the real affirmations of any faculty of the Intelligence, then philosophy itself becomes impossible, and the attempt to realize it, the perfection of absurdity.
TRUE THEORY OF EXTERNAL PERCEPTION.
The way is now prepared for an enunciation of the theory of external perception, taught in this Treatise. Knowledge implies two things, an object to be known, and a subject capable of knowing. Between the nature of the subject and object there must be such a mutual correlation, that, when certaIn conditions are fulfilled, knowledge. arises, as a necessary result of. this correlation. Between matter and mind this correlation exists. The latter knows the former, because the. one is a faculty, and the other an o1~ject of knowledge. Mind percoives the (1u:diLieS (ii matter, becau~o the former has tlio
powei' of perception, and the latter is an olilcct of perception.
Mind also exists in a tn-unity, consisting, as we have seen, of the Intelligence, Sensibility, and Will. To each of these departmeuts of our nature, the external worl~d is correlated.. Certain conditions being fulfilled, particular qualities o~ ma-, tenial substances become to the Intelligence, direct objects of, knowledge. Other conditions being fulfilled, they affect our Sen~ibi1ity, producing in us cortain sensations, either pleasurable, painful, or indiffi~rent. Our Will then acts upon these substances, controlling their movements, and modifying their states, while they, in ~ react upon the~ Will, modifying and limiting its control. In the first instance, knowkdge is direct and immediate. In the second, through a consciousness of sensations, we learn' the correlation 'between those objects and our sensibility. In the last, through a consciousness of. the nisuses of our Will, and an experience of their results, we learn tim correlation between these substances and our voluntary powers. In respect to the mq•nner in which, ~when certain conditions are fulfilled, we know, these objects, the only answer that philosophy gives or demands,.is this: Suchis the correlation between the nature of .the . knowing faculty and that of the objects of knowledge.
It is a sufficient verification of the theory above announced, that it is a statement o the case, as it Pl~CSent9 itself to the universal Intelligence — that it is encumbered with no difficulties which are not involved in every theory of a different kind which has hitherto been presented, and is entirely free from thu~o difficu1tic~ which are J)crfccLly fatal to thuso the~rkM. Every individual believes, that he knows the external world as correlated to the threefold departments of our nature under consideration, and in accordance with the principles above stated. Every theory also must rest, in the last analysis, in respect to the mode of knowledge, upon this one principle, The mind knows, because it is a faculfy of knowledyc. The difficulties which all theories, contradictory to that above announced, involve, are these: either they do not present the facts or conditions- of knowledge, or the manner of knowing, as they are given in the universal Intelligence.
TUE ABOVE TIIEOB.Y VERIFIED AS A TRUTH OF SCIENCE.
As this Theory, however, is regarded, by the author of this Treatise, not only as true, but also as of fundamental importance in philosophy, a more extended and logical verification of it is deemed requisite, than that above given.
QUALITIES OF MATTER.
In accomplishing the object which I have in view, I would, in the first place, direct special attention to a consideration of the q~ualities of matter, as given in the universal Intelligence. According to Sir William Hamilton, such qualities may, and according to a strictly scientific arrangement, should be classed as, Primary-proper, Sccundo-primary, and Secondary.
Priniary gi.ialiUes.
The first class, Primary-proper, include all those properties which belong to Matter, as such, and which cannot, in thought even, be separated from it as Matter. The necessary constituents of our idea of Matter, as such, are two, that it occupfes
51);L(~, ;iiul is r,n,fu,nril in. space. J-Tenco, in the language of the author rckrrcd to, "we have thus eight proximate attributes : 1. Extension; 2. Divisibility; 3. Size; 4. Density or Rarity; 5. Figure; 6. Incompressibility absolute; 7. Mobility; 8. Situation." That which occupies space, and is contained in it, must have extension; else it would fulfill neither of these conditions. An extended substance occupying space and, at the same time, contained it, must also, be divisible, on the one hand, and possess size, on the other, Size which refers to the qua~ifüy of space which the substance occupies. When, on the other hand, we refer to the quantity of matter occupying space, we attain to the conception of the quality of Density or Rarity. That also which)as Extension and Size must. have Form or Figure. That toO which occupies space, and is contained in it, must be susceptible of motion from one point of space to another, and must, at each successive moment,, have a given situation in space. Hence we have the idea of the qualities of Mobility and Situation. These then must be reckoned as the qualities Primary-proper of Matter. They ~distinguislt no one kind of material substa~ce from another, but Matter itself from every other substance, and cannot, even in thought., be separated from it, as Matter.
&'cundo-primary qualities.
i'he Sccundo-primary qualities are those which pertain, not to Matter, as such, but which distinguish different classes of material substances from one another, and which pertain, as essential qualities, to such classes. Thus bodies are classed, in reference to their Gravity and Cohesion, also as heavy and Light, as hard and Soft, Solid and Fluid, Viscid and Friable, Tough and Brittle, Rigid and Flexible, Fissile and Infissile, Ductile and Inductile, Elastic and Inelastic, Rough and Smooth, Slippery and Tenacious, Compressible and Incompres~ible, Resilient and Irresilient, Movable aIILl Ininiuvable. I name the qualities, as givcii by the author above referred to. The classification is undeniably correct, and complete.
Secondary qua Ut~es.
The Secondary qualities are, properly speaking, subjective affections in ourselves, and not properties of Matter at all. They pertain to Matter, only as the causes, unperceived in themselves, of these affections or sensations. Such, for example, arc the qualities r~epresented by the terms Sound, 1'11a-vor, Savor, Tactual sensation, &c.
Whatever may be thought of the propriety of the phraseology adopted, no one can doubt the reality of the distinctions above made, or the consequent propriety of the corresponding classification of the qualities of Matter. My own opinion is, that it would be as well to retain, for the sake of cQnvcniencc, the old classification of Primary and Secondary, making a subdivision of the first class, as Primary-proper and Secundo-primary.
What these qualities are in general.
As no form of statement can excel that given by our author of the general characteristics of these three classes of qualities, I will venture to take from his writings the following extract, in which we have a specific statement of such characteristics
"1. The primary are less properly denominated Qualities (Suchnesses), and deserve the name only as we conceive them to distinguish body from not body— corporeal from incoporeal substance. They are thus merely the attributes of body as body-- corporis ut corpus.
"'Flie Secundo-piiinary and Secondary, on the contrary, are in strict propriety denominated Qualities, for they discriminate body from body. They are the attributes of body, as this or that 1~fl(i of 7)0(/// — C017)Or?.~ flt tale corj~us.
" 2. The :Pi~iiiiai'y rise froiii the universal relations of body to itself; the Secundo-priniary from the general relations of this body to that; the Secondary from the special relations of this kind of body to this kind of animated or sentient
organism. . .. .
"3. The Primary determine the possibility of. matter absolutely; the Secundo-primary the possibility of the material universe as actually constituted; the Secondary the possibility of our relations as sentient existences to that universe.
"4. Under the Primary we apprehend modes of the .N~nego; under the Secundo-primary we apprehend modes both of the Ego and of the Non-Ego,iundcr the Secondary we apprehend modes of the Ego, and infer modes of the Non-Ego.
"5. The Primary are apprehended as they are in bodies; the Secondary as they are in us; the Secundo-primary as they are in bodies, and as they are in us.
"6. The term quality in general, and the names of the qualities in particular, are — in the case of the Primary, unuivoeal, one designation unambiguously marking out one quality-- in the case of the Secundo-primary and Secondary equivocal, a single term being ambiguously applied to denote two qualities, distinct though correlative--that, to wit, which is the mode of existence in bodies, and which is a mode of affection in one organism. .
"7. The Primary and also the Secundo-primary qualities are definite in number and exhaustive, for all conceivable re lations of body to itsçlf, or of body to body merely, are few, and all these found actually existent. The Secondary, on the contrary, are in number indefinite; and they actually bold no proportion to the possibic. For we can suppose in animal organislu, any number of unknown capacities of being variously affected, and, in matter, any number of unknown powers of' thus affecting it, and this though we are unable to imagine to ours(1v08 'what t1u~o actually may ho."
As our author subsequently shows, the "Primary arc conceived as necessary and perceived as actual; the Scoundoprimary are perceived and conceived as actual; the Secondary are inferred and conceived as possible." "The, Primary arc perceived as conceived. The Secundo-primary are conceived as perceived. The Secondary are neither perceived as conceived, nor conceived as perceived; for to perception they are occult, and are conceived only as latent causes to account for manifest effects." The Primary are given in Consciousness, as "modes of a not-self;" the Secondary as "modes of self;" and the Secundo-primary as "modes of self and of a not-self at once." — "In, the apppehension of the Primary qualities the mind is primarily and principally active; it feels only as it knows. In that of the Secondary, the mind is primarily and principally passive; it knows only as it feels. In tim
Secundo-primary the iiiind is equally and at omico active and passive; in one respect it fc~ls as it knows, in another, it knows as it feels." hence, as our author n~might have shown, our knowledge of the Primary qualities is given in our minds, as valid for all Intelligents. Our knowledge of the Secundoprimary is given, as, in one form, valid for all Intelligents, and in another, as valid only for ourselves in the present constitution of our sensitive nature. Our knowledge of the Secondary qualities is given, as valid for ourselves exclusively, and that in the sense last named.
REPRESENTATIVE AND PRESENTATIVE KNOWLEDGE. ;:
Every one is accustomed to distinguish between that kind of knowledge which is direct and immediate, and that which is obtaiucd, mcdiutcljj, that is, through something difl~ring numerically from the object of knowledge. The former kind of knowledge, Sir William hamilton denominates Present alive, amid ~ 1a~(~i', •l~'i ~ kIiOWlO(igO. " An imnicdiato cogiiition," ho says, "inasmuch as the. timing known is itself'
presented to observation, may be called prcscntativc, and inasmuch as the thing presented is, as it were, viewed by the mind
face to face, may be called intuitive. A mediate cognition, ~ inasmuch as the timing known is held up or mirrored to the
mind in a vicarious representation, may be called a representative cognition." No remarks are necessary' to show the reality of the above distinction, or the propriety of the phraseology employed to represent it., '
TRUE THEORY OF PERCEPTION STATED AND VERIFIED.
//
I now lay down the following propositions pertaining to our knowledge of the qualities of matter, propositions which I will then proceed to verify: 1. Our knowledge of qualities Primary-proper of matter is exclusively Prescntàtive, that is, is not me(1 tale, but direct and immediate or intuitive. 2. Our knowledge of the Secundo-piimary qualities is partly Presentatiuc, and partly Representative. 3. Our knowledge of the Secondary qualities, is wholly and exclusively Representative, such qualities being revealed to us, only as the unknown causes of known sensations, and revealed also, as exclusively through such sensations.
That our knowledge of the Secondary qualities is wholly, and of the Secundo-primary, partly, to say the least, Representative, no one will deny. The only question that can arise, pertains to the matter of fact, whether our knowledge of the Primary qualities, and of the Secundo-primary is, in any form, Presentative, and not like that of the Secondary, wholly and exclusively Representative. That we have a direct and ii"iuediate, that is, Prescutative knowledge of the two classes of qualities ~rst named, to wit, the Primary, and Secuudo-primary, É argue from the following considerations :
1. The fact of such knowledge cannot be shown, a priori, to be, in itself, impossible. If an individual should afliriii, that things equal to the same tbings are not equal to to one another, we should have no occasion to appeal to experience to determine the question, whether such a proposition is, or is not, true. Prior to such an appeal, or d priori, we know absolutely, from the nature of the case, that such a proposition is not, and cannot be true. Can we ibus know, that a presentativo knowledge ï~ the qualities referred to, is in itself, an impossibility? Certainly not, and who will amrm the truth of the contrary proposition? Neither the existence, nor the extent or limits, of the Faculty of Knowledge, can be known, ~ priori. The existence of the power of knowledge is revealed wholly and exclusively, through the fact of knowledge. The extent and limits, of the possible reach that power, can be determined, as exclusively, only by what the mind actually does know, and by what is logically implied in such knowledge. We can know, dpriori, that knowledge cannot extend beyond the compass of realities. But how far such realities are, to the intelligence, real or possible, objects of knowledge, or what realities do, in fact exist as objects of knowledge, cannot be known at all, d priori, but, as said above, wholly and exclusively, by a reference to what the mind does, in fact, know, aiid to what is necessarily implied in such knowledge. Suppose, that extended substances actually occupy space, and exist in it, and the Intelligence cannot amrm the reality of ' such existences, to be a natural impossibility, who will pretend to say, that a faculty of knowledge may not be given, to which the essential quahIieM of such substances, as Matter, and as
pai'ticular classes of Matter, shall be objects of direct, and immediate or Presontativo knowledge? Who will pretend, then, to know, a priori, that the human lutchligence, in the very condition of its present existence, is not, in fact, just such a faculty; that such qualities do not, in fact, exist, sustaining to it the relation of objects, while it sustains to them the relation of a power of real Presentative knowledge? The reality of such qualities as objects, and of the Intelligence, as a power of such knowledge, cannot be intelligently amrrned to be, in itself, impossible. Hence, no evidence does, or can exist, a priori, against the truth of the propositions under consideration.
2. It cannot be shown, 4 posteriori, that is, by an appeal to facts, that such knowledge does not, in fact, exist in the human Intelligence. We are absolutely conscious, that our knowledge of the Secondary qualities of Matter is not Prcscntative, but wholly and exclusively Representative. Have we, in fact, a similar consciousness, in reference to our knowledge of the Primary and Secundo-primary qualities of the same substance? The Secondary qualities are consciously given, in the Intelligence, wholly inferrentiahly as the unknown causes of known sensations. Is time quality of extension, in Matter, for example, given in the same Intelligence, consciously in the same manner, and as a precisely similar cause of a similar feeling? On the other hand, while the Secondary quality is given, in Consciousness, as the un/~nïwn cause of a known slate of the Sensibility; is not the primary quality given, as a known object of a known slate of the º~ßeßßß~jencc Y We arc
conscious, that a state of the Sensibility lies between the Intelligence, and the unknown cause of that state, the Secondary quality, and that the reality of that cause is not directly perceived, but inferred. Aro we also conscious, that a known sensation, or state of the Sensibility, lies between the knowii act of tho Intelligence above referred to, flhl(1 its kUOWIL Ol)ject, the Primary quality, that the sensation is, and the quality is not, the immediate object of perception, and that, consequently, the quality is consciously not perceived, but its reality, mediaely inferred? If our knowledge of the Primary qualities of matter is not Presentative, but wholly and exclusively Representative, no one will pretend that we have a consciousness of the fact; nor will any one attempt to prove the fact, a postenori, by an appeal to the facts of Consciousness.
Nor can the same fact be established by an appeal to any known facts connected with the condition of the mind, as connected with its physical organ'iza.tion. What shall be the extent, limits, or modes of its knowledges, in connection with such an organization, or whether it knows all or any of the facts referred to mediately or immediately, cannot be determined, àpriori. All such questions can be intelligently answered, but by an appeal to Consciousness. Now we are not conscious, at all, that all our knowledge of the facts referred to, the Primary qualities of our own physical organism, for example, is, in no form, Presentative, but wholly and exclusively Representative.
Nor do any other known facts anywhere exist, in the uiiiverse of Matter or Mind, from which we can draw the inference that our knowledge of these qualities is not Presentative. The proposition that this knowledge is Representative, then, is neither a necessary intuitive truth, nor is it capable of being established, a posteriori, that is, by an appeal to facts.
3. Hence, I remark, in the next place, that the theory, that all our knowledge of Matter, is exclusively Rcpre~cntativc, that is, through the consciousness of Sensations, rests upon absolutely nothing but a basciess assumption, an assumption wholly unsustained by any form or degree of evidence, d~ j~i'uni, or 4 posfr.rwri, that is, an assumption neither ~clf— evidently true, nor sustained by any known facts of Matter or of Mind. The only merit that can be claimed for it is, that~ liko all false theories in mental science, it rests upon a partial induction of the facts of Consciousness. That all our knowledge of the Secondary qualities of Matter is exclusively Rcp~ resontative, and derived wholl~ through a known mediuth, Sensation, is an absolute fact of Consciousness. Upon this simple fact, the assumption, on which Philosophy, in all ages, has run off the track of truth, has becn~ based, to wit, that all: our knowledge of all the qualities of the same substance, is, and must be, of the same character, and derived exclnsively~ through the same medium. No assumption conceivable is, or: can be, more unreasonable in itself, or more unphilosophically induced. How unreasonable the assumption, that because qualities of a given character, and universally recognized as not fundamental, are known in a given manner, that therefore qualities of a totally different and opposite character, and universally recognized as fundamental, must be known in the: same manner, and through the same uncertain medium.
4. The origin of this assumption should not be overlooked, in this connection, as having a not unimportant bearing upon our present inquiries. This assumption had its origin in an attempt to determine, 4 priori, the nature, extent, limits and mock of human knowledge, facts none of which can, by any. possibility, be determined only a poateriori, or by an appeal to Consciousness. These are all, it should be borne in mind, as facts, contingent and not necessary truths. They cannot, therefore; be determined, 4 priori, but must be resolved wholly 4 postcriOri. This assumption, therefore, is tho exclusive result of a most unscientific procedure in philosophy, a procedure in which mere guessing has ever been substituted for certain knowledge, when the latter was in the immediate presence of the philosopher, and wlie'ii no higher merit was attained, than very poor guessing at that.
5. I now adduce, in favor of the truth of the three prop~sitions under consideration, to wit, that our knowledge of the Primary qualities of Matter is wholly Presentative, that that of the Secundary-priniary is partly Presentativo and partly Representative, and finally, that that of the Secondary is wholly Representative, the direct, immediate, and absolute testimony of universal Consciousness. No one will deny, that in the universal Consciousness, the Primary quality is recognized as the known object of a known act of the Intelligence (Sense-perception), and that the Secondary quality is also recognized as the unknown cause of a known state of the Sensibihity (Sensation). Nor does any one doubt that our knowledge of the Sensation itself is Prcsentativc, wholly so. Now, in all proper Sense-perceptions, we have, undeniably, just as distinct and absolute a consciousness of a direct and immediate or Presentativo aspect or knowledge of the Primary quality, extension for example, as we have of the Sensation itself, when produced by the unknown cause referred to, the Secondary quality. It would be a denial of the facts of Consciousness no more palpable, to affirm, that our knowledge of Sensation itself is wholly Representative, than it would be, to affirm, that our knowledge of the Primary qualities is not Presentative. No honest interpreter of the facts of Consciousness will deny the truth of these statements. The truth of the propositions under consideration can be denied, but upon one assumption, that the same faculty affirms, with the same absoluteness, what is true in regard to Sensation, and what is not true in regard to Sense-perception. The true and only true interpretation of the fiwis of Cunsciousi'icss, on the subject, is this: The Primary qualities are given in Consciousness, exclusively as the known presentative objects of known acts of the Intelligence, Sense-perceptions. The same holds true of the Secundo-primary, so far as they are given as qualities of Matter. So far forth as they are given as causes of Sônsations, they are given as the otherwise unknown causes of known states 'of the Sensibility. The Secondary, on the other hand, are given exclusively as such causes of such states, and in no other form ,as objects of knowledge. In reference to the Secondary qualities, and of the Secundo-primary, so far forth as they are given as causes of sensations, we are conscious of the presence of a medium between us and the object of knowledge, and that it is wholly through such medium that the object is known. In reference to the Primary qualities, and the Secundo-primary, so far as the latter are regar~1ed as essential qualities of their respective subjects, we are t~onscious of no medium between us and the object of knowledge, and still less of the fact, that it is wholly through such medium that the object is known. We can therefore, by no possibility, have a consciousness, that any form of knowledge whatever is Presentative, if we have not that such is the character of our knowledge of the qualities
last named. -
6. I remark, in the next place, that our knowledge of the Primary qualities has all the essential characteristics of Presentative, and none of those of Representative knowledge; while that of the Secondary has all of the characteristics of Representative, and none of those of Presentative knowledge. Our knowledge of the Secundo-primary, on the other hand, so far forth as they are given, as obj ects of Sense-perceptions, has all, and exclusively, the characteristics Presentative, and so far forth, as they are given as causes of sensations, has all, and exclusively, the characteristics of Representative knowledge. In Representative knowledge, the object is never given, as perceived, but its reality exclusively, as 'i~iferrcd; precisely the opposite obtains, in all respects, in Presentative knowledge. In this case, the object i~ given, as known in itself, that is, its renli ty is given, not as inj red, but as peieeived. These are the fundamental distinctions between J?rcscntativo and Representative knowledge.
Now the Secondary qualities of matter are given, in our Intelligence, as not known in themselves. Their reality is 'given exclusively, as inferred, as known only relatively. The Primary qualities are given exclusively, as known in themselves, and their reality as perceived, and not as inferred. The Secundo-primary are given partly, as perceived, and partly, as inferred, and that just so fitr forth as they rank with the PHmary, on the one hand, and with the Secondary, on the other. We experience a sensation pleasurable or painful. We affirm, that it had a cause, and that in the cause, there is a quality adapted to affect our Sensibility, 'in the manner referred to, while 'that Sensibility remains constituted as it now is. The reality of the cause and the quality is giveu, as not perceived, but inferred, and the nature of the quality, not as known as it is in itself, but only relatively to our Sensibility. The Primary quality, on the other hand, that of extension for example, is given as known in itself, and its reality is affirmed as perceived, and not as inferred as the unknown cause of a known sensation, as is true of the Secondary qualities. The same holds true .of all the Primary qualities, and of the Secundo-primary, so far as the latter take rank with the former. We can, by no possibility, make a distinction between Presentativ~ and Representative knowledge, if we have not the~se two kinds of knowledge before us, if our knowledge of the Primary qualities of Matter is not exclusively of thc former kind, and of the Secondary of the lattcr, and if that of the Secundo-primary does not, in tho sense explained, partake partly of both.
7. There are also undeniable facts of Consciousness whici. can be explained but upon the admission of the truth of the propositions which I am now endeavoing to establish. It will not be denied either, that our knowledge of tho Primary, and, ~ in the sense explained, of the Secundo-primary qualities, of Matter, is Presentative, or that all our knowledge of Matter is equally and in the same sense Representative, and derived entirely through the same medium, Sensation. , On the latter supposition, all qualities alike should be given, in precisely, the, same form, as exclusively the unknown causes of known sensations, and all alike given, not as known in themselves,, but only relatively. Their reality also should be given, as not perceived, but inferred. , Now how can one class of qualities, all of which are alike exclusively ybjeots of Representative knowledge, and known as exclm~.si~iely through the same identical medium, be given in Consciousness, as the objects exclusively of Presentative and the other ~s exclusively of Representative knowledge; the one class as known in themselves, and the other as known only relatively; the one class, as exclusively the known objects of known perceptions, and the other with equal exclusiveness, as the unknown causes of known sensa-. tions; the one class as directly perceived, and the other. as merely inferred qualities? On this. theory, the theater of Consciousness is one exclusive scene of palpable contradictions, more irreconcilable than the discords of Chaos and Old Night. If, on the other hand, we suppose that our knowledge of the Primary qualities is really and truly Presentative, and that of, the Secondary as really and tru]y Representative, and finally, that that of the Secundo-primary blends, in the sense explained, both forms of knowledge, then all the facts of Consciousness bearing upon the subject, arc susceptible of a ready and perfectly consistent explanation, and they can be explained upon no other supposition.
8. I remark, finally, that the existence of the conceptions of these qualities, just as they lie in the Consciousness, can, by no possibility, be accounted for, on the supposition, that all our knowledge of Matter is derived exclusively through Sensation, and can be accounted for but upon the assumption of the truth of the propositions which I am endeavoring to establish. We will take, as an example, one quality, that of extension. The conception of this quality must have had its origin primarily in the mind, in consequence of the quality itself having been originally the object of immediate perception, that is, of Prcscutative knowledge; or it must have been derived mediately, as the logical antecedent or consequent of sensation. The direct and immediate perception of the quality will account for the idea of said quality in the mind. Suppose we reject this supposition, and attempt to account for the existence of the idea mediately, as the logical antecedent or consequent of Sensation. If the idea be assumed as the logical antecedent of the consciousness of Sensation, then the reality of the quality must be supposed to account for the existence of the sensation itself. If, on the other baud, the idcft be assumed as the logical consequent of the consciousness of the Sensation, then the quality must be held as an effect of the Sensa-. tion, and Sensation as the cause ~f said quality. No one will take the latter position. Let us, for a few moments, look at the former. As the cause of the sensation, the quality would be known not as it is in itself, but only as the unknown cause of a known sensitive state. It would be the object, not of absolute but of relative knowledge. Further, nothing is necessarily supposed, in the cause, which is not as absolutely revealed in the effect. Now thb sensation has, in itself, the phenomena, neither of length, breadth, nor thickness. [low can the consciousness of such a phenomenon suggest even the idea of the quality of extension, as the cause of such a phenwncnon? Nothing conceivable can be more unphilosophiical than the supposition of such an origination of this idea. Its existence in the Intelligence can be scientifically accounted for, but upon one supposition, that the quality of extension was itself originally given as the object of Presentative knowledge. So of all the other Primary qualities of i~1atter, and of the Secundo-primary, so far as they take rank with the Primary.
The truth, then, of the propositions under consideration, may be assumed as a truth of science, and, as such, employed in the elucidation of the various functions of the Intelligence.
FALSE THEORIES OF EXTERNAL PERCEPTION.
Theories of Sense-perception differing from that above elücidated, Theories formed by philosophers to explain the manner in which the mind perceives external material objects, divide themselves into two classes — those which affirm, that our knowledge of such objects is real — and those which~ affirm that it is not real, and that all that we can know of such objects is our manner of conceiving of them.
Of the former Theories, there are two subdivisions, both agreeing in this, that our knowledge of Matter is, in no form, Presentative. The first affirms, that we know external material objects through the medium of certain Images existing between such objects and the faculty of knowledge." The second affirms, that all our knowledge of such objects is exclusively representative, and derived wholly through the medium of Sensation. The former I will venture to denominate the Scholastic. Theory. The latter has, by Sir William Hamilton, been very properly dcnon~inatcd the Cosmnothctic Theory. The Theories which affirm that our knowledge. of matter is, in no sense, real or valid for time reality or true character of its object, we will denominate the Idealistic Theories. As thus designated, we will notice them, in the order named above.
THE SCHOLASTIC THEORY.
To all of tho forms in which this Thcory,.has been developed, says Mr. Dugal Stewart,' "I apprehend the two following remarks will be found applicable: First, that in the formation of them, their authors have been influenced by some general maxims of philosophizing borrowed from physics; and, secondly, that they have been influenced by an indistinct, butdeep-rooted conviction of the immateriality of the soul; which, although not precise enough to point out to them the absurdity of attempting to illustrate its operations by the analogy of matter, was yet sufficiently strong to induce them to keep the absurdity of. their theories as far as possible out of view, by allusions to those physical facts, in which the distinctive properties are the least grossly and palpably exposed to our observation. To the former of these circumstances is to be ascribed the general principle upon which all the known theories of perception are produced, to the latter, the various metaphorical expressions of ideas, species, forms, .sltwlows, yhantasms, images; which, while they amused the fancy with some remote analogies to the object of our senses, did not directly revolt our reason." Very little in addition to the observations above cited, need be said upon these theories. They all agree in leaving totally unexplained the very difficulties which they profess to explain, to wit, 1~Jow can the mind perceive an object out of itself, and at a distance from itself?
The image between the mind and the object, is as really distinct from the mind, and as really removed from it, though at a less distance, as the object itself. Perception of the intermediate image is just as difficult of explanation, and as truly needs another intermediate image, as perception of the object.
TIlE COSMOTIIETICAL THEORY.
.Aerording to the Cosniothiotie Theory, we have no Presentative knowledge whatever of tho material universe. All such knowledge, on the other hand, is, as we 'have said above, altogether Representative, and derived exclusively, through the medium of Sensation. If the material universe had no' existence, and. we had the same sensations thal we now have, sensations produced by any cause whatever, the immediate interposition of Deity, for example, we should have, from the' laws of our Intelligence, precisely the same Sense-perceptions,~ apprehensions, and knowledge that we now have, and the cx-' ternal universe would be just as real to us, as it now is, and in all rQspects just what it is. ~od has so constituted our Intelligence, that, on occasion/of these Sensations, our percep-' tions, &c., became what they are. Weare sc~ constituted also, that we instinctively believe the universe to be 'what we have conceivcd.it, or rathorperlwps imagined it, to be. In constituting us with such an instinctive belief, the divine veracity stands pledged, that what we thus believe in must be real: for God would not constitute us thus to believe in what is unreal. Thus we are required to believe in an external matcriaF' uni-~' verse, not because we have, in fact, in our experience, any actual, knowledge or perception of its re~tlity, any real evidence" of the fact. Our belief, on the other hand, really rests upon such grounds as the following: 1. Such is the constitution of our intelligence, that on occasion of sensations induced in us, we conceive of an external material universe, as their cause. 2. From the laws of the same constitution also, ~ye instinctively believe in the reality of that of which we have formed a conception. 3. In this constitution, we have a direct revelation from the author of nature, that what we thus apprebend and instinctively believo in as real, i~ real. 4. On the ground, therefore, not of our own perceptions and knowledgcs, but of the veracity of the author of nature, we believe iii the reality of the material universe. This is time ground on which Christian Theists, holding the Sensational Theory, do, in fact, believe in the reality of the material universe, and is the only ground on which they can, by any possibility, believe in it. On this Theory we need only make the following~remarks:
1. It has already been proved to be false.
2. It is in itself, most palpably self-destructive, and selfcontradictory. According to it, God has so constituted our Consciousness, that, in it, the material universe is given, as, in very fundamental respects, the object of real Presentativc, while it is, in fact, the exclusive object of Representative knowledge, and also that certain qualities of Matter are given, as the known objects of known states of the Intelligence, while they are, in fact, nothing but the unknown causes of known states of the Sensibility. Now if the author of nature ha~ deceived us in the constitution of our Consciousness, why should we suppose, that He has not done the same thing, in reference to our instinctive beliefs? If the voice of the author of nature is to be heeded, in our Instinctive beliefs, why not, in the revelations of Consciousness? We should then be required to contradict this Theory, and hold, that certain qualities of matter are, in reality, what they are given, in our Consciousness, as being, to wit, the real objects of Presentative knowledge.
3. This Theory also involves a most vmcious reasoning in a circle. We first reason from this very universe to the reality of the Divine existence and attributes, and then backward from the reality of the Divine existence and attribues to that of the universe from which .wo started. We must first know the universe, at least as real, before we can reason at all, legitimimately, fiom it, to its author or any of his attributes. If the universe, as this Theory affirms, is in reality in itself unknown to us, we can only, find, through it, an unknown God, a God, fiont whose attributes, we cannot legitimately reason to anything. Nothing further need be added to prove that such a Theory cannot be true.
TIlE IDEALISTIC THEORIES.
Of the Theories which affirm, that our knowledge of the material universe is, in no sense real, some affir~m, that there are no objects whatever external to the mind, thatwhatwo have postulated, as the quaiities of ol~jects external to us, are, in fact, nothing but our own mental states seen by the oyo of Consciousness. This is the Theory of' Coleridge, anti of modern Transcendentalists~gcn~ra1ly. Others maintain 'the reality of something callpd mind, on-the' one hand, and of a sotmiething not mind, on the other. They deny, however,that the latter can be to the former, in any sense, an object of real knowledge, or that either is, in itself, what. we take it to be~ When this unknown something, having in itself neither extension nor form, and existing nowhere and in no time (inasmuch as neither time nor space are realities in themselves, but only modes in us of conceiving of things as: external to us), when I say, this unknown and miameless something, in some unknown and nameless manner, affects the unknown something called mind — the latter, by virtue of laws innate in itself, postulates to itself its own sensations as the qualities of substances distinct from itself. Thus the great universe, in which we contemplate ourselves as existing, together with time and space, in which we contemplate ourselves and the universe as having being, is nothing in itself but a'fiction of our own Intelligence. This is the theory of Kant, stated without caricature. Both the kinds of theories under consideration ngroo in this, that what our Intelligence postulates as the qualities of external substances, are, in reality, nothing but men tn! states seen by the eye of Consciousness. External perception is nothing but ~ho eye of Conscioi~sness directed to an affliction wholly subjective, which the Intelligence postulates as the quality of something objective and external to the mind. In Consciousness, mental affections of different kinds are given as subjective and objective: that is, some are given as plienomena of the mind itself, and others as those of objects external to the mind. Hence, according to philosophers maintaining these theories, Consciousness has two distinct functions, the external and the internal. When taking cognizance of some affection which the Intelligence has postulated as a subjecttve phenomenon, this is Consciousness in the exercise of its interior function. When taking cognizance of some affection which the Intelligence postulates as a phenomenon of an object external to the mind, this is Coiisciousncss in the exercise of its exterior function. Sense, according to these theories, is not a faculty of knowledge at all; but only a receptivity of affections or impressions, postulated by the Inte]ligence as the qualities of objects external to the mind. Thus that which we have been accustomed to regard as a real world external to the mind, and altogether unlike ourselves, has no existence out of ourselves. Neither the universe, nor its author have any existence in itself. The1 are mere ideals of our own creating; ideals grand and perfect, and which we are therefore bound to regard and revere, not as realities in themselves, but as grand conceptions — sublime creations of our own Intelligences, creations which are true, as Coleridge remarks simply and exclusively, "because we have 'conceivedthem."
Reasons for these Theories.
Among the rcnsons given for timoso theories, the most impui(aimt', t~imtL all that •~ nOW need to notice, are time following
1. They explain the possibiU~~y of kno~lcdge. Of all things real to us, as objects of knowledge, we havo a direct and immediate Consciousness. All objects of knowledge,' therefore, are brought within the sphere of direct mental vision.:
The possibility of perception is thus fully demonstrated.
2. These theories render the reality and certainty of knowledge self-evident. If nothing exists~ in ~the object, but what our Intelligence has 'put there, our knowledge of the' object:
must be real, certain, and absolute. If, for example, nothing~ exists in a contribution box but what I have put there, and I know what I have put into it, then my knowledge of what the box contains is real and absolute. ' So when I contemplate an object which my Intellig~,uce has postulated 'as external to' ]nyself, if that object is ,in reality nothing but a pure creation of may Intelligence, and contains nothing but what the same Intelligence has put into it, how demonstrably manifest it is, that my knowledge of the object is real and absolute.
Objections to these Theories.
But while these theories apparently, at ~first thought, commend themselves to our minds, as explaining things which would otherwise be wholly inexplicable to us, they are at once, in our Intelligence, met with difficulties perfectly insurmountable.
1. They leave totally unexplained the same mystery hanging over the subject which they profess to explain, that hung over it before, to wit, the possibilit~i of knowledge. The distance
CHAPTER VII.
SECONDARY FACULTIES.
Elements of which Nortions are constituded.
Error of Kant.
Kant's Anatomy of Pure Reason.
CHAPTER VIII.
FACULTY OF JUDGEMENT.
Classification
Generalization.
General Terms.
Understanding and Judgment distinguised.
CHAPTER IX.
ASSOCIATION.
CHAPTER X.
MEMORY AND RECOLLECTION.
Terms defined.
MEMORY and Recollection are treated by philosophers only as important departments of the principle of Association. This, as we shall see, is demanded by sound philosophical analysis. The two terms above named are often used interchangeably, and never distinguished but by the following circumstances. In the process denominated Memory, notions, or conceptions of facts and events, are spontaneously recalled to the Mind. In that called Recollection, these Intellectual states are recalled by an effort of Will.
States of Mind entering into and connected with these Processes.
There are three distict mental operations connected with each of these processes of Mind.
1. Some feeling or state of Mind which has formerly co-existed with the perception or apprehension of the object recalled--a feeling or state spontaneously recurring, or revived by some object of present thought, perception, or sensation.
2. A simple apprehension of the object or event itself~and apprehension attended with no belief or judgment whatever pertaining to the object.
3. A recurrence, in thought, of the circumstances of time and place connected with the perception or apprehension of the object.
The above statement verified.
That objects of Memory and Recollection are not recalled directly and immediately, but are suggested, in the manner above described, is obvious from two considerations.
1. From universal Consciousness. Those who are least accustomed to analyse the operations of their own minds, as well as philosophers, have noticed this fact. Hence the common affirmations: "This reminds me of," or "This suggests to my mind such and such occurences," clearly showing, not merely that such events are suggested, but that the subjects of them are conscious of it.
2. When we wish to recollect any events, or in the common phrase, to recall them, we do not attempt to do this directly, but by directing the attention to various objects, at present before the Mind, that they may suggest those which we wish to recall. Memory and Recollectoin are, in this respect, subject to preciesly the same law, and the law which governs each is the same which governs the entire phenomena of Association. The above remark is so obviously true, that philosophers, as stated above, almost universally treat of these subjects in the same connection, Memory being considered only as one department of Association.
Principle on which Objects are Remembered with Ease and Distinctness.
Taking this position for granted, or as having been already proved, it will follow, as a necessary consequence, that the ease and distinctness with which any objects or events will be recalled to the Mind, will always be proportioned to the depth and intensity of the impressions formerly received from them, and with the number of objects and events with which such impressions have heretofore co-existed, or may hereafter co-exist. This conclusion we also find to be confirmed by universal experience. When you hear the declaration, "Such and such events I shall never forget," suppose you ask the reason for such an affirmation. The answer will invariably be, "It made a deep IMPRESSION upon my Mind." On the other hand, if a person is asked for the reason why he recalls with such difficulty any particular event, he will uniformly answer, "it made such a feeble impression upon my Mind." Assuming that the state of the Sensibility is the regulating principle of suggestion, the fact is self-evident, that the ease with which any particular event will be recalled, depends not only upon the depth and intensity of the impression which it formely made, but upon the number of objects or events with which such impression may have co-existed, and shall hereafter co-exist.
Deep and distict Impressions, on what conditioned.
One inquiry, of no small importance in mental science, here claims our attention, to wit, the circumstances under which impressions received from objects of thought or perception are rendered deep and distict. Among these I notice the three following, as the most important:
1. Attention. In former Chapters it has been shown that attention is the condition of distinct perception, both in respect to the phenomena of Sense and Consciousness. In walking, for example, we do not remember the particular acts of volition, which directed each particular step. Yet we know that we must have been conscious of such acts. They eye that runs carelessly over a particular landscape, and nothing but the most general outline is remembered, while we know that each particular part must have been seen by us. For the want of attention, however, these objects were not distictly perceived. Of course no distict and vivid impression was made upon the Mind, and consequently they are not remembered. The manner in which attention influences Memory is two-fold. It not only impresses deeply and distictly on the Mind particular scenes, each taken as a whole, but all the parts of such scenes. Hence the whole of such scenes will be recalled by the perception or suggestion of any particular part, which may be met with in other scenes. That Memory, however, does not depend primarily upon attention, but on the impression made by objects of attention, is evident form the fact, that the ease with which any particular event is recalled, is not proportioned to the degree of attention devoted to it, but to the vividness of the impression received from it.
2. The impression made upon the mind by a particular event, and consequently the ease with which it will be remembered, depends upon the circumstances in which the event occured~circumstances external to the Mind; such for example, as its occurrence at a time and place unexpected, in connection with other events deeply interesting to us, &c.
3. The impression which events make on the Mind, depends upon the state of the Mind itself, when they occure. Offices of kindness, when we little need them, make a comparatively slight impression upon the Mind. They are accordingly forgetten with comparative ease. But the stanger who watched over us when we were sick, in a strange land, we never forget, for the obvious reason that such occurrences are deeply impressed upon the Mind. Who is not aware that the impression made upon the Mnd in reading a book, listening to a discourse, or witnessing any scene, and consequently the ease and distictness with which they are recalled, depends greatlyupon the state of Mind at the time?
Diversity of Powers of Memory, as developed in different Individuals.
Assuming the principle, that those things of which we have formed distict conceptions, and which have deeply moved and affected our Sensibility, will be easily and distictly remembered, the diverse kinds of Memory, as they appear in different individual, may be readily explained.
Philosophic Memory.
The philosopher is, above all things, interested in universal truths and general pinciple, and in facts which illustrate such truths and principles. With names, and minor circumstances of time and place, he has little or no interest. These, of course, he seldom recalls; while general principles and facts connected with, and illustrative of general principles, he never forgets. Here we have the peculiarites of what may be called Philosophical Memory.
Local Memory.
With general principles, however, the mass of men are very little interested. Events, as mere events, with all their circumstances of time, place, &c., are the things which cheifly interest them. In such cases, general principles, if understood at all, will readily pass from the Mind, while facts and events, with all their adbentitious circumstances, will leave their permanent impress upon it. Here we have the characteristics of what is called Local Memory.
Artificial Memory.
The third and only other kind of Memory which it is necessary to notice, is called Artificial Memory, a method of connecting things easily remembered with those which are recalled with greater difficulty, that the latter may be recalled by means of the former. The manner in which the principle of suggestion operates in this instance, may be readily explained. The two objects are brought into the relation of co-existence with one and the same state of Mind; and the familiar object, by exciting that state, recalls the one less familiar. The inexpediency of resorting to such associations, excepting upon tivial subjects, is so obvious as not to need any particular remarks.
MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS
A few topics of somewhat miscellaneous character, connected withour present inquires wil close this Chapter.
A ready and retentive Memory.
The distiction between what is called a read, and a retentive Memory, next demands attention. A philosophical Memory is know to be the most retentive and least ready. General principles are regarded by the philosopher, as above all price. These of course he never forgets. For the same reason, facts and events, connecte with, and illustrative of general principles leave an impress equally permanent upon his mind. The Memory of such a person however, will not, in ordinary circumstances, be ready, for the obvious reason, that when he wishes to recall the particular fact, he finds it necessary first to recall the general principle with which it was associated. For the same reason, Local Memory will be more ready, but less retentive. The qualities in objects with which such persons are interested, exist alike in such an infinite variety of objects, that when this quality is met with, a great multitude of similar objects will be at once suggested. They will generally be those however, which have been most recently seen. Persons possessing Local Memory merely, will excel in common conversation, and in what may be called loose and rambling composition. Philosophical Memory, displays itself in the laboratory, the hall of science, on the bench, in the lectrue room, and pulpit.
The vast and diverse Power of Memory possesse by different Individuals.
The degree in which this faculty is developed in different individuals, may now be readily accounted for. It is owing, as I suppose, to two circumstances~ natural diversities in which the power is possessed by different individuals, and an accidental direction of the power. Themistocles knew every citizen of Athens by name. Cyrus and Hannibal had each a similar knowledge of every soldier in his respective army. Their original endowments made them capable of such acqusitions. They made such acquistions, because they considered them necessary to the end they designed to accomplish.
Imporvement of Memory.
But for the faculty under consideration, the past would beto us, as if it had not been. No advantages could be derived from experience of our own or that of others. Existence, at each successive moment, must be commenced anew. The same errors and follies, which formerly occurred, must be repeated, without the possibility of improvement. Through this faculty, the past funishes the chart and compass for the future. The progress of improvement is onward, with perpetually accumlating force. The question, therefore, How can this faculty be improved? presents itself, as of special importance. The following suggestions may not be out of place on this point:
1. The first thing to be kept distinctly in Mind, in all plans for the permanent improvement of Memory, is the principle on which its ready and retentive action depends, to wit, deep and distinct impression. All our plans for the accomplishment of the object under consideration, should be formed with direct reference to this one principle.
2. As impressions depend very much upon distinctness of conception, in all efforts, to improve this faculty, we should habituate ourselves to form distict conceptions of objects especially of those which we wish to recollect. In this, manner the impression will not only be deep and permanent, but the ntion associated with it being distinct, will, when recalled, possess a corresponding distinctness.
3. In thought, the object should be located, in distict relation to the circumstances of time and place with which it is associated. In this manner the impression and conception both will not only be rendered deep and distinct, but each circumstance referred to, as it recurs in connection with other thoughts and perceptions will, by exciting the feelings under consideration, recall the object associated with it.
4. Knowledge, in order to be retained permanently, must be systematized and reduces to general permanent principles. Otherwise, it will be exclusively subject to the law of local Association which is so temporary in respect to retention.
5. To converse with others, and write dwon our thoughts which we wish to retain, contributes to permanency and distictness of rcollection. Knowledge, by this means, is rendered distinct, the correspeonding impression deep and permanent, and the whole subject of thought most likely to be systematically arranged. All these circumstances tend to render Memory distinct and permanent.
6. Memory also, to be improved, must be trusted, but at the same time, not overburdended, as is the ase when everything is communicated to it, and without the aid of a judicious diary of important thoughts and occurrences. That faculty which is not exercised will not be developed and improved. Memory is not exempt from this law. At the same time, to everburden a faculty is a sure way to palsy its energies. Nothing but reflection and Judgment, properly exercised, can fix upon the line where memory should and should not be trusted, without the aid of written records of our thoughts, and thus secure a proper develpment of this faculty.
Memory of the Aged.
One of the first indications of approaching feebleness of age, is failure, in a greater or less degree, of the power of Memory. A characteristic precisely the opposite is also sometimes presented in the experience of aged persons~ a wonderful revival of the Memory of the occurrences of early life. A lady of my acquaintance, for example, aged about niney years, had occasion to amuse some of her greate-grandchildren one day. She thought she would, as a means to this end, relate to them the substance of a story, related in verse, which she had read, when quite young. She had never committed it to memory, and doubtless had thought little of it for more than half a century. As she commenced the story, the entire poem came fresh to her recollection. She could repeat it all, word for word. These two facts in the experience of the aged, the failure, on the one hand, and the wonderful revival of this power, on the other, need to be accounted for.
In respect to the first class of phenomena, two reasons may be assigned for their existence.
1. The failfure of the faculty of perception and attention. As a consequence, distict notions are not formed of objects of present thought and perception. Nor do they affect the Mind as they formerly did. For these reasons, the peculiar feelings which have co-existed with former thoughts and perceptions, and would, if revived, suggest them, are not revived.
2. In the failing of the perceptive faculty, there is a corresponding change in the correlation of the Sensibility to objects of thought and perception. Hence the same feelings preciesly are not now excited by objects of thought and perception, as formerly, and consequently former intellectual states are not reproduced.
In respect to the second class, I would remark, that every one is aware, that amid the hurrying scenes of ordinary life, such crowds of associations ruch upon the mind, at one and the same time, that no one entire scene of the past, is often distictly recalled. On the other hand, when we are in a state of temporary isoclation from the varying tide of events which is floating by and around us, then is the time when our recollections of the past become full and distinct. Now the aged are in a state of isolation of a more permanent character. Hence when a past scene is recalled, the Mind is in a state of comparative freedom from all diverting and distracting associations. Consequently the scene, in its entireness, is brought into full and distict remembrance.
Duration of Memory.
If the law of Association illustrated in the preceding Chapter be admitted as true, it will follow, as a matter of course, that Memory is absolutely indestructible. Thought can never perish. If the impression with which any thought has co-existed, should, at any period, however remote, be in any form revived, the thought itself may be recalled. If any element of a given impression be reproduced, no reason can be assigned, why a thought which co-exist with it, myriads of ages ago, should not thereby be realled, as well as the one which co-existed with it but yesterday.
Numberless facts also, which lie around us in society, fully confirm the principle under consideration as a law of Memory. The case of the aged lady referred to above, presents a fact of the kind. The most striking one that now recurs to my recollection is given by Coleridge. It is the case of a German girl who had always labored as a domestic. While Coleridge was on a visit to Germany, and in the vicinity of her residence, she sickened, and if I mistake not, died. During her sickness, she began to utter sentences in languages unknown to all her attendants. Learned men, from a neighboring University, were called in. It was then found that she was reciting, with perfect correctness, entire passages from the Hebrew, Greek, Arabic and Syriac Scriptures, and also from the writings of the ancient Fathers. The occurance was, by many, regarded as miraculous. A young physician in attendance, however, determined to trace out her past history, for the purpose of finding a clue to the mystery. He found at last, that when quite small, the young woman had lived in the family of an aged clergyman of great learning, who was in the daily habit of reading aloud in his study from the writings above referred to. As the child was at work in a room contiguous, she was accustomed to stop from time to time, and listen to those strange sounds, the meaning of not one of which did she understand. There was the clue to the mystery. Those sounds were imperishably impressed upon the Memory. Hence their repetition, under the circumstances named. Cases of a similar nature might, to any extent, be adduced. They point with solemn interest, to the nature of the immortal powers within, as well as to facts of portentous moment in the future development of those powers.
CHAPTER XI.
IMAGINATION.
Imagination and Fancy Elucidated.
Charachteristics of the Creations of the Imagination.
Remarks on the preceding Analysis.
Creations of the Imagination, why not always Fictions.
Imagination the organ of Ideals.
Action of the Judgment relative to that of the Imagination.
Productions in which the action of the Fancy or Imagination is most conspicuous.
Combinations of Thought denominatied Wit, as distinguished from
those resulting from the proper action of the Imagination or Fancy.
Propriety of using the Imagination and Fancy in Works of Fiction.
CHAPTER XII.
REASON.
Secondary Ideas of Reason~Idea of Right and Wrong.
Idea of Fitness.
Idea of the Useful, or the Good.
Relations of the Ideas of Right and Wrong and of the Useful to each other.
Ideas of Liberty and Necessity.
Ideas of the Beautiful and Sublime.
Idea of Harmony~Reflections.
Idea of Truth.
Idea of Law.
The Philosophic Idea.
First Truths, or Necessary Principles of Reason, as distinguished from Contingent Principles.
Idea of Science, Pure and Mixied.
Function of Reason denominated Conscience.
General Remarks pertaining to Reason.
CHAPTER XIII.
RECAPITULATION, WITH ADDITIONAL SUGGESTIONS.
Remarks upon the relations of Intuitions to one another.
Secondary Faculties.
CHAPTER XIV.
SPONTANEOUS AND REFLECTIVE DEVELOPMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE.
Additional Remarks and Illustrations.
CHAPTER XV.
ORIGIN OF IDEAS.
True Explanation.
Manner in which the General, Abstract, and Universal, are eliminated from the Concrete and Particular.
CHAPTER XVI.
LAWS OF INVESTIGATION.
Tesitmony.
CHAPTER XVII.
REASONING
Different kinds of Reasoning.
Conception of Logic.
CHAPTER XVII.
MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS.
Kant's distinction between Analytical and Synthetical Judgments.
Progress of Transcendental Philosophy since the time of Kant.
Remarks upon the Systems above Presented.
Modernn Transcendentalism~Eclecticism of Cousin.
Common Sense.
Characteristics of the German Mind.
CHAPTER XIX.
THE INTELLEGENCE OF MAN, AS DISTINGUISHED FROM THAT OF THE BRUTE.
CHAPTER XX.
MATTER AND SPIRIT.
CHAPTER XXI.
IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL.
CHAPTER XXII.
THE IDEA OF GOD.
We come now to a consideration of the last and most important subject to be investigated in the present Treatise--~the idea of God. In the remarks which I shall make upon this subject, I shall take for granted two important facts:
1. That there are, in the universe around us, two orders of existences~matter and spirit.
2. That there is in our minds the idea of a Being of infinite perfections, who sustains to all conditional existences the relation of an unconditioned and absolute cause. We not only conceive of such a being as possible, but really existing. This may be assumed as the conviction of the race; at least, wherever the Intelligence exists in any considerable degree of development. My object in the present chapter is to elucidate the ground of this conviction.
Preliminary Considerations.
In the commencement of my remarks upon this subject, special attention is invited to the following preliminary considerations:
1. The idea of God, like that of Immortality, is in all minds in whom Reason is in any conderable degree developed. This will be admitted by all who are at all acquainted with the history of the race. The idea of God is a common phenomenon of the universal Intelligence.
2. Like the doctrine above named, it is not in the mind as the result of logical deduction: yet it is there with such weight of conviction, that every one feels that he involves himself in infinite guilt, in denying, or entertaining a doubt of its objective validity. This is evident from the fact, that every sceptic, in the depths of his own mind, believes that, if there is a God, he has forfeited His eternal favor in the denial of His existence, a fact most clearly indicating the consciousness, that in doubting, instead of adoring and worshipping, he has done fatal violence to the laws of his own being.
3. This idea is in the mind with such weight of conviction, as to be apparently incapable of increase or diminution from any process of logical deduction. It may be doubted whether all the propesed demonstrations of the past and present century, have added any considerable weight to the conviction already exicsting upon the mind, of the reality of the Divine existence. Nor have all professed arguments to the contrary, erased this conviction from the mind of the sceptic himself; a fact fully evident from the force with which the consciousness of the fearful reality often leaps upon such minds, in moments of solemn thought, or of sudden calamities, or unexpected exposure to death.
4. As this conviction is not in the mind, as the result of logical deduction, it must be ranked among the primary intuitions or principles of Reason; primary, as opposed to convictions resulting from processes of reasoning.
5. As a first truth of Reason, the Divine existence is susceptible, in the first instance, of the kind of proof common to all first truths, and in the second, of that which is peculiar to all necessary intuitions. In the light of the above observations, we will now proceed to a consideration of the ground of the universal conviction of the reality of the Divine existence.
There are two fundamental forms in which the idea of God is developed in the human Intelligence, to wit, God the unconditioned and absolute cause of all that conditionally exists, and God the Infinite and Perfect. I design to consider this subject in each of these forms.
GOD THE UNCONDITIONED AND ABSOLUTE CAUSE OF ALL THAT CONDITIONALLY EXISTS.
The ground of the belief of the existence of God, considered as the cause, unconditioned and absolute, of all that conditionally exists, that is, of all things whose existence can be conceived of only on the condition of admitting the reality of something else as the condition and cause of their existence, the ground, I say, of the convictions of the reality of the existence of God, contemplated in this light, is simply the apprehension of the reality of the conditioned. The reality of a cause unconditioned and absolute of all that exists conditionally follows, as the logical antecedent, of the conception of the conditioned. This is evident from the fact, that we can no more conceive of the opposite as true, that is, that something conditioned may exist, without a cause unconditioned and absolute, that we can conceive of an event without a cause. Indeed the principle that the conditioned supposes the unconditioned as its logical antecedent, is only one form of announcing the principle of causality. These two principles, which in rality are not two but one, must stand or fall together. The reality of the Divine esistence therefore, contemplating God as the cause, unconditioned and absolute of all that conditionally exists, is just a evident as the principle of causality, to wit, the proposition that no event exists without a cause. The unconditioned, as a matter of fact, does exist. This we know absolutely from Consciousness. Our mental states, as well as our own existence and that of reality and condition of the external world, we necessarily conceive of, as conditioned. God, the unconditioned and absolute cause, therefore, must be. It is impossible even to conceive of the opposite, any more than we can conceive of body without space, succession without time, an event without a cause, or phenomena without substance. No individual does or can, in thought, deny the reality of something conditioned, that is, of somethng caused by something else. It is impossible therefore even to conceive the non-reality of a cause, unconditioned and absolute, of that which we necessarily conceive of as condtioned.
This Principle holds, whether the conditioned be conceived of as finite or infinite.
The principle under consideration holds, in whatever light the conditioned may be contemplated, whether as finite, or infinite. Let X represent the conditioned. Now if every element in X be conceived of a conditioned, that is, depending upon something out of itself, as its cause, the whole of X must depend upon something unconditioned and absolute, out of itself. Even to conceive of the opposite is an absolute impossibility. The idea of God, therefore, contemplating him as the cause, unconditioned and absolute, of all that exists conditionally, is an idea absolutely universal and necessary.
LOGICAL CONSEQUECTS OF THE PRINCIPLE ABOVE ELUCIDATED
Now all that will follow as the logical consequents of the form of the idea of God above elucidated, must be true of him. One inquiry of fundamental importance with the philosopher and theologian is, What are these consequents? To a consideration of some of them, special attention is now invited. What, then, are the attributes which we necessarily ascribe to God, contemplated as the cause, unconditioned and absolute, of all that concitionally exists, and in view of the character of his works, contemplating him as such a cause? Among these, I specify the following:
Eternity.
As such a cause, God must be eternal in his existence. If his existence is not from eternity, then it is an effect of some other cause, and God would not be the cause uncondtioned and absolute of all that condtionally exists.
Freedom as opposed to Necessity.
God, as the cause unconditioned and absolute, is a free, and not a necessary cause. This is absolutely evident from the fact, that the effects of the Divine agency are in time, and not in eternity. A cause that acts of necessity must act, and act to the full extent of its power, as soon as it does exist. If we suppose a necessary cause to exist from eternity, the effects of its action must also be eternal. To suppose the opposite, which must act as soon as it exist, and yet that through the eternity of the past, it did not act at all. The commencement of its action in time, therefore, would not only be unaccountable, but inconceivable. If the human race, the world of mind around us, had their origin in a necessary and not a free cause, their existence would be fom eternity, and not have commence in time. It did commence in time. God, then, the unconditioned and absolute cause of their existence, is a free, and not a necessary cause. This conclusion follows of necessity. Further, to suppose God to be a cause unconditioned and absolute, and yet that he is a necessary and not a free agent, is a palpable contradiction. What is a necessary cause? It is a cause which can act, only as it is acted upon by something out of itself, a something which necessitates its action. A necessary cause, therefore, in its action, must be condtioned, and not unconditioned and absolute. If God, then, is not a free, he is not the unconditioned cause of all conditional existences. Besides the supposition that the unconditioned and absolute is under the law of necessity, implies that the necessitating power acted antecedently to the unconditioned. This is equivalent to denying that God as the first, as well as the unconditioned and absolute cause.
Intelligence.
As an unconditioned and absolute cause, God must be possessed of Intelligence. This follows as a necessary consequece of the fact, that he is a free, and not a necessary agent. Free agency, in the absence of Inelligence, is an absolute impossibilty. W cannot possibly conceive of such an agent. Further, the universe to which God has given existence is one. Every object and element in the universe exists as a part of the great whole. The whole is in perfect adaptation to each and every part, and every part is in adaptation equally perfect to the whole; and the great whole, with all its parts, exists in perfect harmony with fundamental ideas of the Intelligence. Now to suppose that a free cause has created and constituted a universe, all the parts and departments of which, as parts of one great whole, exist in perfect harmony with fundamental ideas of the universal Intelligence, is an absolute impossibility. It is, in reality, the groos absurdity of affirming an event without a cause.
Sprituality.
As the unconditioned and absolute cause of all that conditionally exists, God is a spiritual, and not a material existence. This follows, as the logical consequent of the fact, that he is a free and intelligent, and not a necessary and unitelligent agent.
Moral Agency.
God also must be a moral agent. This likewise is a logical consequent of the fact that he is an intelligent and free agent. Intelligence and free agency cannot be postulated of any being without, as the logical consequent of that supposition, attributing to him moral agency.
The Exercise of Moral Government, in Haromony with the Law of Justice and Goodness.
Every individual, from a consciousness of what is passing in the interior of his own mind, knows perfectly, that in the constitution of his mental being, a moral governement, in harmony with the law of justice and goodness, is actually established. He is conscious, that he cannot act in opposition to the law of justice and goodness, without doing violence to the fundamental laws of his moral being. Here is moral government established. What does its existence indicate, in respect to the character of God, the author and establisher of that government? We must affirm that truth is not revealed at all in nature, or that the fact under consideration reveals God as the moral legislator and governor of the universe, administering his government in harmony with the law of justice and goodness. In the depths of his own Consciousness, every one finds the basis of his convictions in respect to God, as the righteous moral legislator and governor of the universe.
GOD, THE INFINITE AND PERFECT.
We come now to consider the second form in which the idea of God is revealed in the human Intelligence, to wit, God, the Infinite and Perfect.
This is a First Truth of Reason.
That this form of the idea of God is a first truth of Reason, is evident from this one consideration. Should any one attribute to God and acknowledged imperfection of any kind, he would know in himself, that he had thereby involved himself in infinite guilt.